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Abstract 
Using a unique and comprehensive dataset, this paper develops and uses three distinct methods to quan-
tify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system. We examine a sample of 334 banks (rep-
resenting 80% of global bank equity) in 28 countries around 6 global financial crises (such as the Asian 
and Russian crises and September 11, 2001), and show that these crises did not create large probabilities 
of global financial system failure.  First, we show that cumulative negative abnormal returns for the sub-
set of banks not directly exposed to a negative shock (unexposed banks) rarely exceed a few percent. 
Second, we use structural models to obtain more precise point estimates of the likelihood of systemic 
failure. These estimates suggest that systemic risk is limited even during major financial crises. For ex-
ample, maximum likelihood estimation of bank failure probabilities implied by equity prices suggests the 
Asian crisis induced less than a 1% increase in the probability of systemic failure. Third, we also obtain 
estimates of systemic risk implied by equity option prices of U.S. and European banks. The largest val-
ues are obtained for the Russian crisis and September 11 and these show increases in estimated average 
default probabilities of only around 1-2%. Taken together our results suggest statistically significant, but 
economically small, increases in systemic risk around even the worst financial crises of the last 10 years. 
Although policy responses are endogenous, the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of 
central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events we study may be overstated, and that current 
policy responses to financial crises and the existing institutional framework may be adequate to handle 
major macroeconomic events. 
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“In practice, the policy choice of how much, if any, extreme market risk should be absorbed by government authorities is 
fraught with many complexities. Yet we central bankers make this decision every day, either explicitly, or implicitly through 
inadvertence. Moreover, we can never know for sure whether the decisions we make are appropriate. The question is not 
whether our actions are seen to have been necessary in retrospect; the absence of a fire does not mean that we should not have 
paid for fire insurance. Rather, the question is whether, ex ante, the probability of a systemic collapse was sufficient to warrant 
intervention. Often, we cannot wait to see whether, in hindsight, the problem will be judged to have been an isolated event and 
largely benign.” 
International Financial Risk Management, Remarks by 
Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Washington, D.C. November 19, 2002 
 
1 Introduction 
Systemic risk in the banking system has rightly attracted the attention of financial researchers (as well as 
regulators and policymakers) since the genesis of the discipline; bank failure and either simultaneous or 
subsequent macroeconomic collapse represents a financial dislocation with large and far-reaching conse-
quences. Indeed the recent debate on the necessity for reforms to the global financial architecture depends 
critically upon the ability of the global payments system to weather massive, albeit localized, economic 
shocks.  As Rogoff (1999) notes, “More immediately, developing country financial instability poses a po-
tential threat to industrialized country banks.”1 
Despite its importance, we know little about the absolute magnitude of such a systemic failure.  
Recent structural changes to the global financial system have led to competing theories about whether this 
probability has increased or decreased. On one hand, industry consolidation, dramatic increases in capital 
mobility, relaxations in international lending restrictions, and changes in capital allocation rules have raised 
the specter that, for example, a credit crisis in emerging markets might bleed into developed credit markets 
                                                 
1 Much of this discussion centers on policies to constrain volatility of short-term capital flows to developing countries, which is 
clearly related to the probability of systemic banking failure via banking bailouts and the need for lenders of last resort to 
both countries and distressed banks to ensure continued access to credit in the aftermath of crises.  See for instance  Fischer 
(1999),  Rogoff (1999), and Summers (2000). 
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via disruptions in local lending channels.2 In contrast, others (see especially, Darby 1994) have argued that 
recent financial innovations (e.g., the burgeoning credit derivatives market) and the increased activity of 
non-banking financial intermediaries (e.g., re-insurance companies) may have lessened the risk that sys-
temic shocks are transmitted throughout the global banking system. Indeed, much of the acrimonious ar-
gument over Basel II credit allocation rules has focused upon the ability of large financial institutions to 
internally measure and manage the risk of credit crises without transmitting such shocks to other banks, 
and whether such measures will be adequate to forestall insolvencies in the wake of a major macroeco-
nomic dislocation.3 
Using unique data on exposure measures, this paper directly tests the strength of the transmission 
mechanism between banks under the assumption of capital (equity) market efficiency for a large sample of 
international banks. Specifically, we use three separate approaches to infer the increased risk of systemic 
banking failure by examining a sample of banks around significant financial crises (Mexican devaluation in 
1994, Asian crisis in 1997-1998, Russian default and LTCM in 1998, Brazilian devaluation in 1999, and the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). First, we show that there are generally small abnormal returns to 
banks without exposure to the crises, whereas exposed banks tend to have large abnormal returns over the 
same periods. Second, using a version of the Merton structural model of the firm, we extract default prob-
abilities and show that there are small “flow-through” effects of the crisis on an unexposed bank’s prob-
ability of failure. Third, we derive estimates of bankruptcy probabilities using daily options market data and 
show that these crises events are associated with only modest increases in default probabilities for banks 
unexposed to the crises. In short, we find little evidence of substantial systemic transmission of financial 
shocks through developed economies even prior to the imposition of Basel II capital rules. However, the 
                                                 
2 For example, see DeNicolo and Kwast (2001) for an analysis and discussion of the effect on systemic risk of banking industry 
consolidation, and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) on the linkages between banking and currency crises. 
3 See also Acharya (2001) and cites therein for recent theoretical work on systemic risk. 
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interpretation of our results depends somewhat on the subjective assessment of what constitutes a “large 
change” in the probability of a systemic failure. 
1.1 Existing Literature 
Financial economists in academia, central banks, and international organizations alike have in-
tensely studied various facets of the recent financial crises in Latin America, Asia, and Russia. While theo-
retical models (e.g. by Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), Allen and Gale (1998), and Rochet and Triole 
(1996)) analyze systemic risk in interbank lending relationships, most empirical work focuses not on sys-
temic risk per se, but on contagion effects in order to identify the mechanics and channels through which 
these crises spread across markets and countries.4  To illustrate, Kho, Lee and Stulz (2000) study the effect 
of currency crises and the LTCM crisis on a sample of 78 U.S. banks and document that banks with expo-
sures to a crisis country are adversely affected by crisis events and positively affected by IMF bailout an-
nouncements. Similarly, Kho and Stulz (2000) examine the impact of the Asian crisis on bank indices in 
four developed and six Asian countries. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) study the probability of joint occur-
rences of extreme returns across countries (co-exceedances) and find that contagion depends on interest 
rates, exchange rate changes, and conditional volatility, and that the United States is not immune from 
contagion from Latin America, but is insulated from Asian contagion. Linkages between economies in cri-
sis periods and potential spillover effects from one country to another may, for instance, exist in the form 
of trade (Glick and Rose (1999); Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)) or through financial linkages (Baig 
and Goldfajn (1999); Goldfajn and Valdés (1998)). In contrast, the analysis in this paper pertains directly to 
the phenomenon of systemic risk among banks and attempts to provide an empirical assessment of the 
                                                 
4 Karolyi (2003) gives an excellent analysis and critique of different approaches to define and measure contagion. De Bandt and 
Hartmann (2000) offer a broad review of the theoretical and empirical literature on contagion and its systemic implications. 
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likelihood of a failure of the global banking system. It thus addresses the important issue of quantifying the 
consequences of contagious effects, rather than explaining their existence. 
Conceptually, a systemic failure in the global banking system could be defined as a failure (seizing) 
of the global inter-bank payment system or a loss of confidence in banks which results in a global ‘bank-
run’. For example, payment failures could mean that banks not receiving payments on loans (explicit or 
implicit) would become technically insolvent. Cascading bank insolvencies and bank-runs could cause ad-
ditional financial and economic spillovers such as rapid credit reduction, and ultimately, macroeconomic 
contraction (see, for example, Bernanke (1983)). Prior research has discussed how different types of 
shocks might cause systemic risk. For example, Kaufman (2000) describes systemic risks that can arise 
from a “big shock” (e.g., failure of a major bank ), “spillovers” (e.g., East Asian contagion), and “common 
shock” (e.g., 9/11). Other researchers have distinguished between credit and operational risks. Since there 
does not exist an easy or accepted way of classifying shocks by type (and we examine only 5 events), we do 
not attempt to draw conclusions about how different types of shocks affect changes in systemic risk prob-
abilities.  
Our first method for estimating this risk of a systemic failure relies on measuring the impact of 
global financial shocks on the stock price of a subset of banks that are not directly exposed to the shock. 
Specifically, the abnormal performance of these stocks should reflect primarily the probability of systemic 
failure in the banking system. In efficient capital markets, negative information such as devaluations of 
emerging market currencies or the tragedy of 9/11 will affect bank stock prices only if banks are exposed 
to the particular events. In contrast, unexposed bank stock prices should be largely unaffected by these 
events. As a result, stock market reactions of unexposed banks to crisis events can be interpreted as a 
crude measure of systemic risk. This is because negative returns of these banks are not due to direct expo-
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sure to the crises per se, but they are the result of negative returns of exposed banks that affect unexposed 
banks through the financial system.5  
Other researchers (including some of those noted above) have also used market prices of stocks 
and stock options to evaluate bank risks. For example, Pettway and Sinkey (1980) show that stock market 
returns can be used as an effective early-warning tool for identifying U.S. banks likely to fail. Bongini, 
Laeven, and Majnoni (2002) use a Merton model to estimate East Asian bank failure probabilities during 
the Asian crisis and find that these estimates respond more quickly to changing financial conditions than 
ratings of credit risk agencies (but did not outperform measures using only balance sheet data).6 Swidler 
and Wilcox (2002) find that equity option implied volatilities of banks add timely information about bank 
risk beyond what is available from other measures and suggest that this information can be used to more 
accurately estimate bank failure probabilities. However, none of these papers attempt to measure systemic 
risk. 
1.2 Overview of Methodology 
Our analysis is based primarily on a sample of 334 banks in 28 countries representing about 80% 
of global bank equity. The first of our three approaches examines equity returns of unexposed banks dur-
ing financial crises. Both raw returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for unexposed banks show 
relatively small declines (typically less than 4%) regardless of time horizon or exposure definition. The ex-
ception is immediately after 9/11 when CARs for unexposed banks are in the range of -4% to -6%. 
Our second method provides more precise point estimates of the likelihood of systemic failure 
based on a structural credit risk model (i.e., Merton, 1974). We derive maximum likelihood estimates of 
                                                 
5 Even in the absence of systemic failure, financial crises could on average have a negative effect on global economies and there-
fore on banks in general. If we measure this effect, it will bias our estimates of systemic risk upward. 
 
6 See also Krainer and Lopez (2001). 
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probabilities of and corresponding distances to default for the sample banks as a function of characteristics 
such as market value, face value of debt and demand deposits, and asset volatility. While the model relies 
on several simplifications, model misspecification may largely wash out in intertemporal comparisons of 
the recovered default probabilities. Consequently, we interpret the difference between average pre-crisis 
and post-crisis probabilities for banks that are not directly exposed to the crisis as a measure of systemic 
risk. Our results suggest very little chance of increased systemic failure during any of the crises, although 
there is a noticeable reaction to the LTCM credit crisis in the aftermath of the Russian shock. For example, 
the largest increase in average default probabilities for unexposed banks occurs during the Asian crisis 
when probabilities increase from 2.1% to 2.8%. Our estimates of increases in systemic failure are less than 
1% across all crises, with much of the impact on unexposed banks generated by European banks. 
Our third approach for assessing systemic risk in the banking system comes from estimating bank 
default probabilities implied by equity option prices. This method has the advantage of not relying on rela-
tively infrequent (and stale) accounting data. In addition, the model can be estimated real-time using exclu-
sively live market quotations thus making it a potentially valuable regulatory tool. Our analysis assumes a 
particular model for option prices that explicitly includes the probability of bankruptcy. Parameters of the 
model are estimated using a large set of publicly traded options on a subset of European and U.S. banks. 
The model makes the important assumption that over a finite horizon stocks follow a delta-geometric ran-
dom walk (see Câmara (2004)) and thus have a finite chance of going bankrupt. The valuation equations 
can be inverted to yield the probability of bankruptcy. Because of data limitations, the sample is restricted 
to 14 European and 62 U.S. banks. Again, we study the difference in implied default probabilities between 
exposed and unexposed banks and find that none of the crises are associated with a substantial increase in 
systemic risk. The crises events with the largest impacts are the Russian/LTCM crisis and 9/11, but these 
events engender an average increase of only about 2% in the default probability for the unexposed banks. 
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1.3 Policy Implications and Paper Organization 
The results in this paper have important policy implications. While a priori a justifiable and sensible 
concern, the findings of low probabilities of a meltdown of the international financial system suggest that 
the distress of central bankers, regulators and politicians about such events may be disproportionate.  In 
essence, this would be empirical confirmation of the simulation evidence presented by Gould, Koury, and 
Naftilan (2004). Of course, the lack of systemic risk may also be a result of contemporaneous and judi-
cious policy actions by central bankers and regulators. Thus, the findings could be interpreted as justifying 
the responses of these actors during the crises. Either way, given that chances of systemic failure appear 
low even during major financial crises, it seems that financial intermediaries on a global scale are more effi-
cient and robust than often thought (or feared), and that current policy tools and responses may be more 
than sufficient. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 examines stock market reac-
tions of portfolios of banks that are not exposed to a particular crisis event. Section 4 provides more pre-
cise point estimates of bank default probabilities and thus systemic risk based on structural models of fail-
ure. Section 5 derives probabilities of a systemic failure from equity option prices of banks. Section 6 
summarizes the results and concludes. 
2 Sample Construction and Data Sources 
The key to all of the three approaches we use to estimate the risk of systemic failure is that the market 
price reaction for banks without direct exposure to a crisis event reflects the increased risk of failure in the 
system as a whole. Thus, we analyze the default probabilities of a global sample of banks during emerging 
market financial crises in Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia and Long-term Capital Management (1998), 
and Brazil (1999) and for differing degrees of exposure to these events. Moreover, we include the terrorist 
attack on September 11, 2001 since New York is a critical world financial center and widely publicized dis-
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ruptions in the payment system and financial markets occurred (i.e., Bank of New York’s operations, clos-
ing of equity markets, and squeezes in the repo market). Although this crisis may be fundamentally differ-
ent in origin from the other crises, its inclusion provides valuable evidence over the cross-section of crises 
“causes”.  Appendix A lists the dates we associate with each crisis as well as a brief description of each 
event.  
To construct our sample, we select all banks that are in the list of the largest 100 banks in the 
world compiled by Euromoney for at least one of the years between 1997 and 2002. We exclude banks 
that are private/state-owned (e.g. Westdeutsche Landesbank). Subsequently, we manually identify the main 
issue/listing of these banks in their home market on Datastream and exclude those that have no stock re-
turn data. We then add all banks in the Datastream banking index. The final sample consists of 334 banks 
in 28 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, UK, and the United States; see Table 1). These 
banks represent roughly 80% of global bank equity capital (book values) during the sample period. 
2.1 Accounting for Mergers 
For all of these banks, we manually search the Global Access database in order to retrieve their 
annual reports for the crisis years. Due to the complex merger and takeover activities in the banking sector 
during the sample period, the different names for banks used on different databases, and the change of 
names, security identifiers and legal entities over time, the compilation of the dataset is complex. To illus-
trate, the bank listed as Yasuda Trust & Banking Co. Ltd. on Global Access became Mizuho Asset Trust & 
Banking Co. Ltd., the name used on Datastream, with the last filing of Yasuda at the 12/20/2001 and the 
first of Mizuho at 03/31/2002. Similarly, Credito Agrario Bresciano SPA CAB (the name of the entity on 
Global Access) emerged as consolidation at a regional level through the acquisition and absorption of 
Banca Lombarda (the name on Datastream) in 1995. 
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In many cases, we account for multi-way mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. For example, we 
consider that Chemical Banking Corporation merged with Chase National Bank in 1996 to form Chase 
Manhattan Corporation, which merged with J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. on December 2000 to form J.P. Mor-
gan Chase & Co. By the same token, BOE Corporation of South Africa undertook a three-way merger 
with NBS Boland Group Limited and Orion Selections in August 1998 and was taken over by Nedcor 
Limited effective January 2003. Fortis (B) of Belgium was controlling the Belgium operations of Fortis and 
had equal voting powers in the holding entity overseeing itself and Fortis (NL), which controlled the 
Dutch operations. This two-tier structure was unwound and combined into one group, called Fortis 
Group, unifying the two separate legal entities under the Fortis brand in early 1998. In mid-1998, Fortis 
Group took over Generale Bank, which was fully integrated into its operations by mid-1999. 
2.2 Exposure Classifications 
The annual report information from Global Access is verified and complemented with annual re-
ports from EDGAR, Global Reports and Perfect Information.7 Subsequently, banks are classified into 
those with and without exposure based on information published in their annual reports as this can be as-
sumed to be public information that is reflected in stock prices (Table 1). Only in a few cases are we not 
able to obtain an annual report for a particular bank and year and thus exclude the bank from the analysis 
of the respective crisis. Annual reports are used since no better sources of information about exposures are 
publicly available for a large sample of banks (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2001; Kho and Stulz, 
2000). For each bank, the annual report that is closest to the first event of the crisis is manually 
searched/read to identify information on exposure (typically loans) to the crisis country. In particular, U.S. 
banks report very explicitly about the country composition of their loan portfolio. Based on this informa-
tion, banks are classified as exposed or unexposed. Three alternative measures of exposure are used: expo-
                                                 
7 Global Reports is an online information provider of public companies in full-color, portable document format (PDF). 
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sure to the crisis country (“country”); exposure to the crisis region (“region”); and a broad measure of ex-
posure that refers to any relevant exposure of a bank to a particular crisis (“broad”). 
For example, Bank of America Corporation reports in their 1998 annual report loans of USD 
1,501 million to Brazil and of USD 43 million to Russia, giving rise to exposure to the crises in these coun-
tries. The 1997 annual report of Abbey National indicates that it has some, though small, regional expo-
sure to the Asian crisis, but it does not give a breakdown by country: "The financial crisis in Indonesia, 
South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia impacted on markets world-wide. However, Treasury 
sustained its profit growth through careful management of risks throughout the year. At the end of 1997, 
the Group’s exposure to these troubled Asian economies totaled just over €500 million (0.3% of total 
Group assets) and consisted of bonds issued by banks guaranteed or supported by their national govern-
ments." For the LTCM crisis, we consider those banks that participated in the rescue of the fund exposed 
in the narrow sense since these banks were willing to put up their own funds to prevent the crisis from 
worsening. These are mostly the 10 LTCM commercial bank creditors and a few others directly invested, 
i.e. Citicorp, Bankers Trust, Chase, JP Morgan, UBS, Dresdner Bank AG, Credit Suisse First Boston, Su-
mitomo Bank, Republic National Bank, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Credit Agricole, Banque Paribas, and 
Societé Generale. In the region (broad) definition of LTCM exposure, banks with country (region) expo-
sure to the Russian crisis are added, respectively.  
For the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11, all banks in New York City are in-
cluded in the narrowest exposure category, the regional classification adds all banks with headquarters in 
New York City, Boston, London and Frankfurt, and the broadest exposure category further includes all 
U.S. banks reflecting the fact that the potential threat in the post-crisis period was to Western money-
center banks. Table 1 summarizes the exposure distribution of the banks by country, and Tables B-1 and 
B-2 in Appendix B report descriptive statistics by exposure category and the categorical correlation coeffi-
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cients (phi) between all the exposure categories. Finally, we note that if annual reports do not completely 
disclose banks’ exposures, this should bias our estimates of systemic risk upward. 
3 Returns of Exposed and Unexposed Banks 
Our first approach to estimating the risk of a systemic failure relies on observing the market reaction to 
global financial shocks for a subset of banks that are not directly exposed to the shock. In particular, we 
assume that the abnormal performance of these stocks reflects the probability of systemic failure in the 
banking system. In efficient capital markets, negative information such as devaluations of emerging market 
currencies or the tragedy of 9/11 will affect banks only if they are exposed to the particular events. In con-
trast, unexposed banks should be largely unaffected by these events. Results by Lee, Kho and Stulz (2000) 
document that market participants can indeed distinguish between exposed and unexposed banks. As a 
result, stock market reactions of unexposed banks to crisis events can be interpreted as a measure of sys-
temic risk.  
3.1 Results on Raw Returns 
Table 2 provides simple (raw) holding period returns of value-weighted portfolios of banks with and with-
out exposure and the corresponding market indices for the different crises and exposure concepts. Returns 
for the bank stocks as well as the respective market indices are based on logarithmic daily dollar returns. 
The crisis or event dates (t=0) are defined as December 19, 1994 (Mexico 1994), July 2, 1997 (Asia 1997), 
August 17, 1998 (Russia 1998), September 2, 1998 (LTCM), January 6, 1999 (Brazil 1999) and September 
11, 2001. Here we examine the Russian default and the ensuing problems at LTCM separately since opin-
ions differ on which event constituted a more important crisis. Holding periods are calculated for the pre-
crisis period (calendar days -110 to –11), the crisis period (–10 to +50), and the post-crisis period (+51 to 
+120 (and +121 to +209 for the Asian crisis)). Nonparametric Wilcoxon tests are performed to test for 
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differences in holding period returns between the bank portfolios and the corresponding market portfo-
lios, as well as between exposed and unexposed banks. 
For returns in U.S. dollars (Panel A), exposed banks tend to have larger negative holding period re-
turns compared to unexposed banks. To illustrate, banks with exposure to the Mexico crisis had dollar 
holding period returns of –3.0%, while unexposed banks had zero returns during the crisis. Similarly, hold-
ing period returns of exposed banks are –5.4% and –24.9% during the Asian and Russian crises, respec-
tively, while unexposed banks have returns of 6.4% and -7.3%. Similar effects are apparent during the 
LTCM crisis, with exposed banks returning -18.3% vs. 2.0% for unexposed banks. In contrast, exposed 
banks appear to have larger returns than unexposed banks for the Brazil crisis and 9/11. Results for re-
turns in local currency are similar (Panel B). Nevertheless, the differences in holding period returns are not 
large enough to be significant in most cases which suggests the need for more powerful econometric 
methods. While this result could be interpreted as crisis shocks affecting exposed as well as unexposed 
banks in similar ways, the lack of significance is likely the result of noise in the tests and missing control 
variables. 
3.2 Results on Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Because of the limitations associated with examining differences in returns, we turn to tests that assess the 
impact of the crisis events on unexposed banks in the presence of various control variables. In particular, 
we control for general market dynamics by including the return on the local market index or the Data-
stream world market index in the regressions. Similarly, we control for sensitivity to macroeconomic fac-
tors resulting from the characteristics of the banks’ asset and liability composition by including exchange 
rate returns and interest rates in the regressions. 
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Depending on the controls we use, we define several measures of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR).8 First, we examine just raw returns. Next, CAR1 is based on abnormal returns defined as the dif-
ference between raw returns of the value-weighted portfolio of unexposed banks and returns on a portfo-
lio of corresponding market indices. CAR2 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between 
raw returns of the value-weighted portfolio of unexposed banks and returns on the Datastream world 
market index. CAR3 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between returns of the value-
weighted portfolio of unexposed banks in excess of the Euro-currency interest rate and predicted excess 
returns from a regression during days –110 to –11 of returns on a portfolio of corresponding market indi-
ces, the Canadian Dollar, the German Mark, the French Franc, the British Pound, the Italian Lira, the 
Japanese Yen and the one-day return on a 7-day Euro-dollar deposit on the return of a value-weighted 
portfolio of unexposed banks. Bank and market index returns are in excess of the Euro-currency interest 
rate. Currency returns are calculated as the difference between the one-day Euro-currency rate of the for-
eign currency (compounded by the exchange rate) and the one-day Euro-currency rate of the U.S. dollar. 
CAR4 is similar to CAR3, but uses the world market index instead of the value-weighted portfolio of mar-
ket indices corresponding to the composition of the bank portfolio. 
Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns of unexposed banks during the immediate post-
crisis period covering the calendar days 0 to +50 (+210 for the Asian crisis), where the event date (t=0) is 
defined as before. For 3 of the crises (Mexico, Asia, and Brazil) the unexposed bank portfolios have posi-
tive CAR4s, and for the three other crises the CAR4s are slightly negative with only 9/11 being signifi-
cantly negative across all measures. The fact that we see little if any negative reaction in the portfolios of 
unexposed banks in the wake of these significant impacts on the financial system, after controlling for the 
                                                 
8 In order to account for the fact that U.S. equity markets were closed after September 11, 2001 for 4 days, we calculate one 
weekly return for all banks in the sample between September 10 and September 17. 
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usual systematic effects, is a weak indication that the implied probability of a failure of the financial system 
is relatively low. 
Figure 1 offers a graphical representation of the CARs of value-weighted portfolios of exposed and 
unexposed banks (based on CAR4 as defined above) and provides a clear picture of exactly how the re-
turns of unexposed banks react in the crises. For the Mexican, Asian, and Russian/LTCM crises (Panels A, 
B, C, and D) the unexposed banks show positive cumulative abnormal returns. During the Asian crisis, 
unexposed banks actually perform very well (in sharp contrast to the exposed banks). Banks unexposed to 
Brazil show slightly negative CARs whereas exposed banks show a surprisingly large positive CAR.s. This 
is probably due to the resolution of uncertainty regarding the Brazilian situation and the generally positive 
response to the government’s handling of the devaluation (e.g., Brazilian stocks rallied). Only after 9/11 do 
unexposed banks show a significant negative cumulative abnormal return. Interestingly, while both ex-
posed and unexposed banks drop in the immediate wake of the 9/11 event, exposed banks rapidly recover 
(possibly as a result of immediate policy responses by central banks) before falling back to the level of the 
unexposed banks. As expected, exposed banks tend to underperform unexposed banks. For the remainder 
of the paper we focus on just the September 2, 1998 event date for the Russian/LTCM crisis since Panels 
C and D are so similar, and there appears to be a somewhat bigger market reaction to the problems sur-
rounding LTCM. 
3.3 Robustness Tests For The Existence of Institutional Support 
Because of the broadness and international composition of our bank sample, a confounding effect 
in our results could be the differing degrees of institutional support across our panel of banks.9 That is, 
banks with exposure to the crisis but with a high probability of a governmental bailout will have less risk 
                                                 
9 This measure would be highly correlated with, yet slightly broader than, the distinction of existence of either explicit or implicit 
deposit insurance, as in Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002). 
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than exposed banks who do not enjoy such support. To test the robustness of our results to this factor, we 
subdivide the exposure classifications into high and low institutional support categories and re-estimate the 
CAR results. Banks are classified as having high institutional support if their Fitch Public Support Rating 
as of the crisis date is 1, 2 or 3; ratings of 4, and 5 are associated with low support, and banks without rat-
ings are dropped from the sample.10 The Fitch Bank Support Rating is a measure of both the willingness 
and the ability of a potential supporter (either a sovereign nation or an institutional owner) to provide as-
sistance when a bank liquidity or insolvency event occurs. The results for all crises are graphed Panels A-E 
of Figure 2. 
Overall, our results are mostly unchanged (or strengthened, especially in the cases of the Mexican and 
Russian crises) when we incorporate the effects of institutional support. Of particular note is the lack of 
relationship between returns and level of support; if anything, banks with low degrees of institutional sup-
port tend to systematically outperform corresponding portfolios of banks with higher support within each 
exposure category (potentially indicating some degree of moral hazard or government intervention in lend-
ing policies). Banks with higher risk due to lower support tend to produce higher returns in the wake of 
financial crises. Particularly in the aftermath of the Mexican and Asian crises, this premium can be quite 
significant, but controlling for support does not seem to affect the key finding of low systemic risk. 
Taken together, the results of this section suggest that the financial crises (and contagions) of the 
1990s posed little threat to the global financial system though the terrorist attacks of 9/11 seem to have 
had a much larger effect. One limitation of the abnormal returns approach is the assumption that market 
portfolios are not significantly affected by systemic failure in the banking sector. One way to address this 
concern, and at the same time make potentially more precise point estimates of systemic risk, is to estimate 
firm-specific models of bankruptcy. Therefore, the remainder of the paper examines two such methods. 
                                                 
10 This also provides an additional robustness check in that it weights the portfolios towards larger, more liquid banks. 
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4 Estimating Default Probabilities from a Structural Credit Risk Model 
In order to get more precise point estimates of systemic risk, we assess the default probabilities of banks 
during the crisis periods under a structural model of default estimated from an observed series of equity 
prices. The structural approach to estimating default revolves around the intuition developed by Merton 
(1974), that a firm’s securities can be priced as contingent claims on the value process of the firm. Merton 
(1977) points out the applicability of the contingent claims approach to pricing deposit insurance in the 
banking context. The approach has been applied by Ronn and Verma (1986), Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld 
(1984), and Duan (1994).11  Using the estimation procedure in Duan (1994, 2000) and Duan et al. (2003), 
we use equity prices and balance sheet data from pre-crisis and post-crisis periods to infer the implied 
changes in default probabilities for exposed and unexposed banks by country. We then aggregate across 
regions to assess the increased probability of bank failure attributable to the crisis event. Using this meth-
odology to assess the risk of systemic failure around the crisis events, we can find no evidence of an in-
crease in systemic risk. Indeed, the estimated increase in the risk of systemic failure is less than 1%. 
4.1 Methodology 
Structural models define equity and risky debt values, and by extension the probability of bankruptcy, as a 
function of the firm’s asset value, its payout, risk-free rates, its expected return and volatility, and the 
amount and maturity of its debt. We can thus invert the problem and use the equity value, accounting data 
on the debt structure, the risk-free rate, and the firm’s expected return and volatility to solve for an implied 
probability of bankruptcy. If we further assume that the value of the firm follows a geometric diffusion, 
and that the equity value of the firm is some function of firm value (typically a call option on the firm as-
sets), the problem simplifies to statistically estimating the mean and volatility of a diffusion from equity 
                                                 
11 Work by Laeven (2002) and Kaplan-Appio (2002) has recently used variations of the Merton deposit insurance framework to 
assess moral hazard in national and international guarantors and to provide forward looking estimates of banking crises. 
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data. A maximum-likelihood approach to this problem is derived in Duan et al. (2003), where the likeli-
hood function for the equity value of the firm is derived in a structural model framework. Maximizing this 
function yields estimates (and asymptotic distributions) for the expected return and asset volatility of the 
firm, which can be then (non-linearly) used to solve for implied default probabilities of the firm. 
The only difficulty in estimating structural models of default results from the fact that two critical 
parameters, the asset drift and the asset volatility, are unobserved. Traditional approaches as in Ronn and 
Verma (1986) or Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) use transformations under the structural model to 
relate asset values and volatilities to equity values and volatilities respectively.12 Equity volatility is ap-
proximated with either its historical estimator, or more recently, estimates obtained from options data. The 
estimate of equity volatility is then used with the equity value to solve for the asset value in the other equa-
tion and the process proceeds until some convergence criterion is reached. The estimates of the asset value 
and volatility, together with the balance sheet data items on bankruptcy threshold (debt face value), debt 
maturity, and (in the Leland and Toft (1996) model) cash payouts, are used to generate either the bond 
value or the default probability under the model.13 
As Duan, Gauthier, Simonato, and Zaanoun (2003) and Ericsson and Reneby (2004) point out, this 
approach has several flaws: (1) The procedure is theoretically inconsistent since it estimates the asset vola-
tility as a constant when it is clearly stochastic under the assumed model. The primary effect of this incon-
sistency is to invalidate inference under the procedure, since neither estimate will be consistent; (2) Results 
in Ericsson and Reneby (2004) show that the approach is practically biased as well as inefficient, producing 
standard errors that are several orders of magnitude higher than the maximum likelihood approach; and 
                                                 
12 Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000) describe a similar approach to estimating default probabilities in a commercial context by 
KMV, now owned by Moodys. 
13 Procedures similar in spirit to this are employed in recent work by Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Duffie and Wang (2004), but 
in these cases the goal is to generate covariates for a regression, and the inference on the actual estimates is not of direct in-
terest. 
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(3) Estimates of asset volatility are most likely to be biased in cases where leverage is high and stock prices 
have moved significantly over the period. 
A maximum likelihood estimation approach with the methods developed by Duan (1994) based on 
transformed data and applied to structural credit models by Ericsson and Reneby (2004) and Duan et al. 
(2003) addresses these issues. Simply, it derives the likelihood function of the data under the model as the 
product of the likelihood function of the implied asset values and the Jacobian of the (monotonic) equity 
price transformation evaluated at the implied asset values. The asset value and volatility estimates and as-
ymptotic distributions are then straightforwardly obtained by maximizing the likelihood function and ap-
plying standard distributional arguments. In Appendix C, we briefly outline the methodology we use to 
generate our estimates. 
4.2 Implementation of Structural Model Tests 
In order to compute the default probabilities, we first need to fix values for “constant” balance sheet val-
ues, such as the face value and maturity of the debt, or equivalently the point at which the bank “fails”. 
Duan et al. (2003) suggest (for manufacturing companies) using the full value of the short-term liabilities 
(which in our banking case are deposits and other short-term debt) plus ½ of the long-term liabilities as 
the face value of debt.14 They set the maturity of debt at 1 year, for all times, reflecting either pure conven-
ience or a periodic “auditing,” which in our case can be interpreted as an annual bank examination. In our 
implementation, interest rates are assumed constant.15  In our estimation, we use a constant 1 year matur-
ity, and two separate definitions of the default barrier: the short-term and currently due portion of debt 
plus the immediately due demand deposits; or this definition plus half the long-term debt of the bank. For 
most countries, and certainly in aggregate, the changes in estimates pre- and post-crisis are fairly robust to 
                                                 
14 This follows at least from the disclosed version of the approximations made by Crosbie and Bohn (2001). 
15 Comparative static exercises show little effect from variations in the interest rate, reflecting the relatively short maturity of the 
option. Of course, stochastic rates and high (and varying) correlations between asset value and interest rates could materially 
affect the model, albeit substantially increasing both the complexity and required assumptions of the model. 
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the various specifications. As is well known, accurately estimating the drift of even a perfectly observed 
diffusion process is difficult, and is particularly challenging in our case, where our pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods are approximately 250 days. As a consequence, we set the drift of the process equal to the average 
of the German (later the Euro), Japanese, and US short-term interest rates over the crisis period.16 
We estimate volatility of the asset process and the implied asset values using equity values for the 
year prior to the date of the crisis (these dates are given in Appendix A) and for the year after, excluding 
respectively the 2 days before and after the actual date. The annual frequency of the balance sheet items 
complicates the analysis since we need to have a default barrier for each data point. We linearly interpolate 
the values for all dates over the period, using end of year values for accounting items. The interpolation 
method has the advantage of producing a smooth implied asset value process, which is more consistent 
with the theory, and in particular avoids “jumps” in the implied default probabilities due to impounding 
the entire change in the barrier to one day at the end of each period. 
Once we obtain estimates for the asset volatility of each bank (as reported in Table 4), we calculate 
the default probability for the pre-crisis period using the asset value implied 2 days prior to the crisis and 
for the post-crisis period using the asset value implied 2 days after. We then average these estimates across 
exposure levels and regions and report these means in Table 5. We also compute a measure of each bank’s 
distance to default (DTD), which can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations between current 
asset value and the insolvency point. Averages of these measures are reported in Table 6. Daily default 
probabilities are calculated during the year pre-crisis and post-crisis using the estimated asset volatility cor-
                                                 
16 An earlier version of this paper attempted to estimate the drift as well as the volatility for both the Russian and Asian crises, 
and as expected, estimates of the drift were very unstable and had very large standard errors such that in only a few cases the 
drift was significantly different than zero. We have experimented with varying assumptions for the drift of the process, in-
cluding setting it to zero, using the actual daily regional rate for each date, using the actual daily country rate for each date, 
and setting it to several (low) constant values. The estimates we report are not markedly different than our results for each of 
these alternative specifications. 
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responding to the period and the implied asset values for each date. The averages of these default prob-
abilities across exposed and unexposed banks for each of the five crises are graphed in Figure 3. 
4.3 Results From Structural Model Tests 
We find little evidence that the financial crises we study created widespread systemic risk in the interna-
tional banking system. All estimates of the change in default probabilities for unexposed banks are less 
than 1%, with the largest (.655%) occurring during the Asian crisis. The two earliest crises, Mexico and 
Asia, produce the largest increase in default probabilities for exposed banks (at 1.7% and 3.2%, respec-
tively) whereas the later crises are marked by small decreases in default probabilities.17  The Brazil crisis, 
the largest decrease in default probabilities for exposed banks, probably reflects the widely anticipated na-
ture of the devaluation, and the run-up in stock prices (and subsequent growth in the economy) following 
the crisis. The most curious result is the drop in default probabilities for the banks unexposed to 9/11 that 
is attributable primarily to a drop in risk for European banks, perhaps indicative of a flight to safety away 
from money center banks and to smaller, regional European banks. 
Regional effects show that at least with regard to the Asian crisis, European banks have the great-
est jump in the default probabilities for unexposed banks, indicating that this is the region with the most 
transmission of systemic risk. Intuitively, European banks also show a significant increase in default risk 
during the Russian crisis, with unexposed banks’ default probabilities nearly doubling from 1.3% to 2.6%. 
Asian banks seem to suffer increased risk of systemic failure in the Mexican crisis but show few effects in 
subsequent crises, perhaps reflecting the relative strengthening of the Japanese banking system in the late 
1990s. 
                                                 
17 The reported standard errors are based on the variance of the asset volatility and are computed using the outer product of the 
gradient at the estimate. The small size of the default probability errors is a function of the fact that the only source of uncer-
tainty is the asset volatility, which is very precisely measured. 
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Results on distance to default (in Table 6) show that as a group the unexposed banks are farther 
from default than the exposed banks. The primary result from this analysis is that there is very little 
change, either in exposed or unexposed groups, in the DTD metric from pre-crisis to post-crisis. If there 
was a significant increase in the probability of systemic failure in the banking system, it does not appear to 
have changed the individual risk of bank insolvency. 
Rather than focusing on the exact point estimates of default probability or DTD, which depend on 
the implied asset value just before and just after the crisis, Figure 3 shows the entire time series of default 
probabilities for the whole pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Panel A, depicting the Mexican crisis, is a 
classic example of an increase in default risk for exposed banks and a (smaller) jump for the unexposed 
portfolio. A similar dynamic is shown in Panel B, the Asian crisis, with an even more dramatic increase in 
exposed bank risk and only a small increase in the risk of systemic failure. Panel C, the Russian crisis, 
clearly shows that while there is little effect on exposed banks immediately post-crisis, there is a significant 
jump in risk later in September as the full impact of LTCM exposure becomes apparent. Again, there is a 
similar, but much muted, response in the unexposed banks, and eventually the exposed banks’ default risk 
declines and the unexposed banks’ increase until they meet nearly a year after the crisis. Panel D, the Brazil 
crisis, shows the widely anticipated nature of the crisis, as exposed banks have a very large jump in default 
risk prior to the crisis date (in October 1998) when the sovereign payments problems became critical and 
reserves outflows accelerated.18   
Results for 9/11 (Panel E) are curious; while there is little change in exposed banks, this may be in 
part due to the relatively low default levels at which they enter the crisis. The unexposed banks’ decline in 
default risk is anomalous and is related to a fall in the estimated asset volatility (possibly due to shifting of 
assets in a flight to safety).  However, it also highlights a limitation to this type of estimation which re-
                                                 
18 Given the date, and the jump in Russian exposure banks’ default risk, this may be attributable to overlap in the exposure 
measures. In fact, the overlap between measures (given in Table A-2 of the appendix) shows a correlation of 0.65, which is 
significant, but probably not enough to fully account for the jump. 
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quires use of accounting data which are available only infrequently and with a lag.  For this reason and be-
cause it may provide a more effective policy tool, it would be nice to devise estimates of default probabili-
ties that can be independently estimated using only real-time data.  Consequently, in the next section we 
turn to one potentially powerful method for estimating daily default probabilities with options market data.   
Overall from this section, we conclude that the evidence from structural models supports our hy-
pothesis that banks not directly exposed to these major financial dislocations did not suffer significantly 
greater risk of failure due to increased systemic risk in the international financial system. 
5 Estimating Default Probabilities from Equity Option Prices 
Our third approach to assess the risk of systemic failure uses default probabilities of banks implied in their 
equity option prices. In a complete market, equity option prices reflect market estimates of the risk-neutral 
distribution of future stock prices (see, for example, Breeden and Litzenberger, 1978). Likewise, assuming 
a known asset price process or distributional form allows for the estimation of unobserved process pa-
rameters, such as implied volatility from a Black-Scholes (BS) model. In this section, we utilize an option 
pricing model by Câmara (2004), in which asset prices follow a geometric random walk but may jump to 
zero (bankruptcy) with a finite probability. We assume that the probability of unexposed banks’ stock 
prices jumping to zero is analogous the probability of a systemic failure in the banking system. Using daily 
stock and option prices for 62 U.S.-listed banks and 14 major European banks, we solve for the implied 
value of this parameter.  
5.1 Description of Options Data 
Our options data for U.S.-listed banks are provided by a major options market maker and data for 
European banks are from the LIFFE and EUREX exchanges. Our sample includes all banks with listed 
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options on these exchanges and cover many of the largest American, European and global banks.19  The 
data are not available until 1996, so we examine all but the Mexican crisis. We use daily settlement put and 
call prices for near-the-money American options (strike price divided by underlying stock price between 
0.7 and 1.3) for options with maturities between 15 and 195 days. This yields an average of 46.2 observa-
tions per bank per day or 1,100,484 unique option prices across all four crises we analyze. 
5.2 Implementation of Option-Based Measures of Default 
Câmara (2004) derives in closed-form the price of options given a delta-geometric random walk (δ-
GRW) distribution for the underlying stock price. The pricing equation may be inverted to yield implied 
values for the volatility, σ, and the bankruptcy probability, δi. We estimate values for these parameters by 
minimizing the sum of squared percentage error for each bank on each day. We assume risk-free rates to 
be LIBOR equivalents and subtract the present value of dividends from the stock price.20  The optimiza-
tion restricts both parameters to non-negative values. If the optimization does not converge (e.g., as the 
result of data errors) we drop that bank-day. In 16.7% of cases the estimated value of delta is zero.21  In 
97.7% of cases with estimated delta greater than zero, the value is statistically greater than zero at the 5% 
confidence level. Estimates for the implied volatility parameter are always significantly greater than zero at 
the 5% confidence level. We average the estimated parameters for each day. This yields daily time series 
for each crisis which are plotted in Figures 4-7. For each figure, Panel A shows average values of the vola-
tility parameter, σ,  and Panel B plots the variable of interest, the average bankruptcy probability, δi. In 
each graph separate lines are plotted for exposed and unexposed banks (using the broad measure classifi-
                                                 
19 The LIFFE and EUREX banks are Abbey National, ABN Amro, Barclays, Bank of Scotland, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, 
Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank, Hypovereinsbank, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard Charterd Bank, and 
UBS Group. 
20 Our results are essentially unchanged if we limit the analysis to call options with no dividends paid before maturity. 
21 An estimated value of zero for delta is equivalent to a preference for the Black-Scholes model over the augmented δ-GRW  
model. 
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cation except for 9/11 which uses the regional classification). We also plot the implied volatility of the 
S&P 500 index (VIX) in Panel A to serve as a comparison. 
5.3 Results on Options-Based Estimates of Systemic Risk 
Results for the Asian crises are plotted in Figure 4 and show that there is little immediate reaction 
in the options markets to the depreciation of the Thai Baht after July 2, 1997. Implied volatilities, and to a 
lesser degree implied bankruptcy volatilities, drift up over the next two months. In fact, implied bank-
ruptcy probabilities for both exposed and unexposed banks remain in a tight range around 1.0% until 
Monday October 27, 1997 when the implied bankruptcy probabilities for exposed banks more than double 
to about 2.6%. Interestingly, implied bankruptcy probabilities for unexposed banks are essentially un-
changed. The sudden jump for exposed banks on October 27th is likely the fallout in global capital markets 
from the Taiwanese Dollar devaluation of the previous week which was considered particularly ominous 
because of Taiwan’s large foreign currency reserves. On October 27th, Asian markets collapse, lead by the 
Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index losing 5.80%. In New York, the Dow Jones Industrial Average posts its 
single-biggest point loss ever, falling 7.18%. The decline in the U.S. markets is so steep that it triggers the 
first ever (and only, to date) suspension of trading. Latin American markets also suffer panic selling with 
stock prices in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico seeing their biggest single-day losses.22  Arguably, this may be 
the single date during the Asian Crisis when market fear of systemic failure was greatest. Over the subse-
quent weeks implied bankruptcy probabilities increase slightly (to about 2%) for unexposed banks while 
values for exposed banks trend upward, eventually reaching almost 4%. We interpret these findings as 
consistent with the prior findings that markets did not price a significant risk of systemic failure during the 
Asian Crisis. 
                                                 
22 Condensed from a detailed timeline of the Asian Crises by Nouriel Roubini at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/. 
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Results for the LTCM crisis are presented in Figure 5. Qualitatively the results are similar to those 
for the Asian Crisis. Around the event date, estimated default probabilities change little for unexposed 
banks. However, default probabilities for exposed banks increase significantly to over 4%. Starting in the 
second week of September default probabilities increase for all banks—to nearly 4% for unexposed banks 
and to about 8% for exposed banks. This run-up coincides with the first public rumors of Long-term 
Capital’s (LTCM) demise and the associated potential failure of a major investment bank. Later in the Fall 
(t>25), the implied bankruptcy probabilities of all banks again increase though the values for unexposed 
banks only briefly reaches the generally higher levels measured for exposed banks. The evidence from this 
time period is less conclusive because we observe somewhat large absolute changes for unexposed banks. 
Results for the Brazilian default are presented in Figure 6. Although implied volatilities for exposed 
banks appear to tick up about 5% around the event date, implied bankruptcy probabilities show a slight 
decline. This is consistent with the prior evidence which suggests any concerns about systemic failure dur-
ing this period were negligible.  
Results surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are presented in Figure 7. Panel A 
shows that for the first four trading days of September, values for sigma are relatively constant around 
30%, but starting September 7th the volatility estimates start increasing rapidly. In fact, the increases on 
Friday, September 7th and Monday September 10th for exposed banks are substantially larger than any prior 
daily increases in 2001. This is consistent with rumors of trading in the stocks and options of airlines and 
financial companies (both in the US and in Europe) by persons with advance knowledge of the terrorist 
attacks.23  On September 11th, volatilities of European banks spike further to the highest level of the year 
as U.S. markets close in response to the attacks (not plottted). When U.S. markets re-open on September 
17th, implied volatilities gap higher. Over the next few weeks bank volatilities remain high, reaching a 
                                                 
23 See, for example,  “Profits of Doom,” by Grant Rigshaw, Sunday Telegraph (London, U.K.), September 23, 2001. 
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maximum on September 20th-21st. For the remainder of the year values trend downward and finish the year 
near the annual average value. 
Panel B plots average implied bankruptcy probability, δ. Surprisingly, immediately after September 
11th there is no significant change in the estimated probability of bankruptcy for either exposed or unex-
posed banks (though there is about a 1% increase for each in the prior week). However, in late September 
and early October, coinciding with the anthrax attacks on U.S. government and media offices, the implied 
bankruptcy probability starts to increase notably for both exposed and unexposed banks. Bankruptcy 
probabilities peak around October 20th and stay high for the remainder of the year. Interestingly, bank-
ruptcy probabilities for both exposed and unexposed banks follow a very similar pattern over this time 
frame though exposed banks have consistently higher values.  
It is difficult to interpret these patterns as suggesting the terrorist attacks caused a significant in-
crease in the probability of systemic failure. Although the implied probability of bankruptcy of unexposed 
banks does increase after the terrorist attacks, it does so with a significant delay. This is not the result of 
any data or estimation issues since no corresponding delay is evident in the implied volatility estimates. In 
addition, there is no uncertainty regarding the time frame in which market participants and regulators were 
most concerned about dangers in the financial system (i.e., the two weeks immediately after the attacks).  
Examining just the European banks whose options continued to trade during the week of the attacks does 
not reveal any immediate increase in default probabilities (and reversal) over the very short-term. In sum, 
the graphical evidence does not support the hypothesis that the terrorist attacks led to a significant risk of 
systemic failure in the global financial system. The increase in bankruptcy probabilities with the onset of 
the anthrax attacks might be the result of a fear that terrorists might engage in sustained attacks against 
Western targets. 
Table 7 quantifies changes in average estimated default probabilities of unexposed banks from the 
pre-crisis to post-crisis periods. Panel A compares the average delta from the 100 trading days prior to 
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each crisis date with the average delta for the first 20 and 50 (or 200 in the case of Asia) trading days after 
the crisis date. Simple non-parametric estimates for p-values for the post-crisis averages are generated by 
comparing post-crisis averages with the distribution of deltas in the 100-day pre-crisis period. The Asian 
crisis and Brazilian devaluation show no significant increase in average delta. However, the Rus-
sian/LTCM and 9/11 events each show a significant increase in average delta of about 2%. It is important 
to recall from the plots in Figures 6 and 8 that the higher averages are not from immediately higher levels 
of delta but from generally higher levels over the ensuing month(s).  
5.4 Statistical Tests of Option-Based Estimates of Systemic Failure 
To get a more precise estimate of the change in default probability we estimate fixed-effect panel 
regressions with the daily estimate of each bank’s delta as the dependent variable. To determine the effect 
of the crisis on estimated deltas, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-crisis period and 0 
otherwise. A significant coefficient on this variable indicates a statistically significant increase in delta in the 
post-crisis period. Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of these regressions and indicates that the changes 
in estimated default probabilities in the post-crisis period are always significantly different from zero 
(though negative for the Brazilian devaluation). Nonetheless, the largest increase is still economically quite 
small (i.e., 2.17% after the Russia/LTCM event).  
Inspection of Figures 5-8 suggests that average estimated deltas are autocorrelated. We are also 
concerned that model overfitting resulting from data errors could exaggerate estimates of the delta pa-
rameter on average (since it is constrained to be non-negative). Consequently, we expand the specification 
in Panel B to include as control variables (i) the one-period lagged value of estimated delta, and (ii) the 
model sum of squared errors for that bank-day. Results are presented in Panel C of Table 7 and show that 
these controls attenuate the coefficient estimates for the crisis dummy. In particular, the estimated coeffi-
cients remain statistically significant but none are greater than 1% in magnitude.  
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Overall, it appears that the specific events we consider are not associated with a substantial in-
crease in estimated bankruptcy probabilities immediately after the event dates. However, the average in-
creases are statistically significant, so this conclusion is not driven by our tests lacking power. The magni-
tude of the average changes for Russia/LTCM and 9/11 (about 1-2%) may or may not be economically 
significant based on one’s own views. In absolute terms these do not seem like large changes, but they rep-
resent large changes relative to the average levels observed in the pre-crisis periods.  
6 Conclusion 
Systemic risk is a matter of great concern to central bankers, regulators and politicians around the world. 
The resilience of the global financial payments system is a key component of both domestic and interna-
tional financial stability.  Because a breakdown of the banking system is likely to occur in the context of an 
(international) financial crisis, the analysis of major financial disasters such as emerging market currency 
crises or the terrorist attack of 9/11 appears relevant. Interestingly, existing research has mostly focused on 
the mechanics and channels of the transmission of shocks from one country to another during crisis peri-
ods. In contrast, little is known about the magnitude of systemic risk per se, in the sense of the probability 
of bank default and a concomitant failure of the banking system. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by taking three different approaches to provide reasonable es-
timates of the risk of a systemic failure. Based on our large sample of global banks, we interpret the gener-
ally small increases in estimated default probabilities of unexposed banks as indicating that these crises 
generated little risk of a systemic failure in the global financial system. There are several possible explana-
tions for these results. First the shocks may not be large enough. Second, effective policy responses may 
have limited the risks. Third, our methods may not be able to accurately measure the risks. Finally, the risk 
of systemic failure simply may not be as large as many observers believe. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Exposed and Unexposed Banks 
The figure shows cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for value-weighted portfolios of exposed and unexposed 
banks for different crises. The crisis period covers the calendar days –10 to +50 (+210 for the Asian crisis), where 
the event date (t=0) is defined as 19Dec1994 (Mexico 1994), 2Jul1997 (Asia 1997), 17Aug1998 (Russia 1998), 
2Sep1998 (LTCM 1998), 6Jan1999 (Brazil 1999) and 11Sep2001 (Sept. 11, 2001). The cumulative abnormal return 
CAR4 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between bank portfolio returns in excess of the 
Euro currency interest rate and predicted excess returns from a regression during –110 to –11 of returns on the 
world market index, the Canadian Dollar, the German Mark, the French Franc, the British Pound, the Italian 
Lira, the Japanese Yen and the one-day return on a 7-day Euro-dollar deposit on the return of a value-weighted 
portfolio of exposed/unexposed banks. Bank portfolio and world market index returns are in excess of the Euro-
currency interest rate. Currency returns are calculated as the difference between the one-day Euro-currency rate 
of the foreign currency (compounded by the exchange rate) and the one-day Euro-currency rate of the U.S. dol-
lar. Panel A refers to the Mexican crisis 1994, Panel B to the Asian crisis 1997, Panel C to the Russian crisis 1998, 
Panel D to the LTCM 1998 crisis, Panel E to the Brazilian crisis 1999, and Panel F to the terrorist attack on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Exposed and Unexposed Banks (continued) 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Exposed and Unexposed Banks (continued) 
Panel D: LTCM Crisis 1998
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Exposed and Unexposed Banks (continued) 
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 Figure 2: Public Support CARs for Exposed and Unexposed Banks 
The figure shows cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for value-weighted portfolios of exposed and unexposed 
banks with differing degrees of public support for different crises. High support is defined as a 1, 2 or 3 rating in 
the Fitch Public Support Rating and low support is defined as a 4 or 5 support rating. All ratings are measured for 
each bank at the crisis date. The crisis period covers the calendar days –10 to +50 (+210 for the Asian crisis), 
where the event date (t=0) is defined as 19Dec1994 (Mexico 1994), 2Jul1997 (Asia 1997), 17Aug1998 (Russia 
1998), 2Sep1998 (LTCM 1998), 6Jan1999 (Brazil 1999) and 11Sep2001 (Sept. 11, 2001). The cumulative abnormal 
return CAR4 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between bank portfolio returns in excess of 
the Euro currency interest rate and predicted excess returns from a regression during –110 to –11 of returns on the 
world market index, the Canadian Dollar, the German Mark, the French Franc, the British Pound, the Italian Lira, 
the Japanese Yen and the one-day return on a 7-day Euro-dollar deposit on the return of a value-weighted portfo-
lio of exposed/unexposed banks. Bank portfolio and world market index returns are in excess of the Euro-
currency interest rate. Currency returns are calculated as the difference between the one-day Euro-currency rate of 
the foreign currency (compounded by the exchange rate) and the one-day Euro-currency rate of the U.S. dollar. 
Panel A refers to the Mexican crisis 1994, Panel B to the Asian crisis 1997, Panel C to the LTCM 1998 crisis, Panel 
D to the Brazilian crisis 1999, and Panel E to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. 
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Figure 2: Public Support CARs for Exposed and Unexposed Banks (continued) 
Panel B: Asian Crisis 1997
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Figure 2: Public Support CARs for Exposed and Unexposed Banks (continued) 
Panel D: Brazilian Crisis 1999
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Figure 3: Smoothed Default Probability Estimates 
This plot shows the default probabilities averaged across banks exposed and unexposed to each crisis event. The 
estimates are obtained from the estimated asset volatilities and implied asset values from the structural model. 
The assumed default horizon is 1 year, the default barrier is assumed to be demand deposits plus short-term debt, 
and the average of USD, Euro (German), and Japanese short-term government rates at the crisis date is used as 
the riskfree rate. Default probabilities for each bank are computed using maximum likelihood from data the year 
prior (PreCrisis) or the year after (PostCrisis) the crisis date, with a linearly interpolated default barrier.  
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Panel C: LTCM Crisis 1998
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 Panel E: September 11, 2001
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Figure 4: Implied Bankruptcy Probabilities from Option Prices: Asian Crisis 1997 
The graphs below plot the implied volatilities (Sigma, Panel A) and implied default probabilities (Delta, 
Panel B) from option prices of banks around the Asian crisis. Estimates are daily averages of the banks 
exposed and unexposed to the crisis event (Day 0) obtained via non-linear least squares estimation of 
the Câmara delta-geometric option pricing model. VIX is the S&P 500 implied volatility index. 
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Figure 5: Implied Bankruptcy Probabilities from Option Prices: Russian/LTCM Crisis 1998 
The graphs below plot the implied volatilities (Sigma, Panel A) and implied default probabilities (Delta, 
Panel B) from option prices of banks around the Russian crisis. Estimates are daily averages of the banks 
exposed and unexposed to the crisis event (Day 0) obtained via non-linear least squares estimation of the 
Câmara delta-geometric option pricing model. VIX is the S&P 500 implied volatility index. 
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Figure 6: Implied Bankruptcy Probabilities from Option Prices: Brazilian Crisis 1999 
The graphs below plot the implied volatilities (Sigma, Panel A) and implied default probabilities (Delta, 
Panel B) from option prices of banks around the Brazilian crisis. Estimates are daily averages of the 
banks exposed and unexposed to the crisis event (Day 0) obtained via non-linear least squares estima-
tion of the Câmara delta-geometric option pricing model. VIX is the S&P 500 implied volatility index. 
 
Panel A: Average Implied Volatility 
20%
30%
40%
50%
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
exposed banks unexposed banks VIX
sigma
1/6/1999
 
Panel B: Average Implied Default Probability 
0%
2%
4%
6%
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
exposed banks unexposed banks
delta
1/6/1999
 44
 45
Figure 7: Implied Bankruptcy Probabilities from Option Prices: September 11, 2001 
The graphs below plot the implied volatilities (Sigma, Panel A) and implied default probabilities (Delta, 
Panel B) from option prices of banks around the terrorist attacks. Estimates are daily averages of the 
banks exposed and unexposed to the crisis event (Day 0) obtained via non-linear least squares estima-
tion of the Câmara delta-geometric option pricing model. VIX is the S&P 500 implied volatility index. 
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Table 1: Sample Statistics on Banks 
The table shows the total number of banks in the sample as well as the number of banks that are exposed to different financial crises by country. Banks are 
classified as having exposure if the annual report at the time of the crisis contains evidence about a positive exposure to the respective country/region (e.g. 
through a loan). Broad exposure refers to any relevant exposure of a bank to a particular crisis, independent of its significance. The event dates (t=0) are de-
fined as 19Dec1994 (Mexico 1994), 2Jul1997 (Asia 1997), 17Aug1998 (Russia 1998), 2Sep1998 (LTCM 1998), 6Jan1999 (Brazil 1999) and 11Sep2001 (Sept. 
11, 2001). 
  Number of exposed banks 
 Country exposure  Region exposure  Broad exposure 
 Mexico RussiaAsia LTCM Brazil 9\11 Mexico Asia Russia LTCM Brazil 9\11 Mexico Asia Russia LTCM Brazil 9\11
Country 
Total 
# of 
banks 1994 1997 1998 1998 1999 2001  1994 1997 1998 1998 1999 2001   1994 1997 1998 1998 1999 2001
Australia           
            
          
       
           
                  
            
          
     
             
                
                 
          
          
                  
           
           
          
                
                 
                
          
           
          
               
y 7  1 1     2 1 1    6 7 6 1 6  
       
      
4 3 1 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 4 4 3 4
Austria 6 3 2  
 
1 3 3 3 2 1 3 3 3
Belgium 5 2
 
1
 
2 1 4 2
 
1
 
3 1 4 2 2
 
3
Brazil 3 3  3  3  3 3 3 3
Canada 8 4 4 1 5 6 5 4 1 5 6 5 5 4 5
Denmark 4 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
France 6 1
 
5 6 3 6 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6
Germany 16 4 10 2 2  3 10
 
10 10 6 7 3 10 10 10 8 7
Greece 8 1  1 1 7 7 8 1 8
Hong Kong
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland
 
4 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 25 2 7 10 10 7 10 11 10 10 8 11 14 11 14
Japan 99 7 10 4 1 6 9 17 5 4 10 13 20 17 5 17
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands
 
3 1 1 1  1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Norway 2 1 1  
 
1 1 1 1  
 
1 1 1 1
Portugal 7 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 3 3 5 4 5
Singapore 4 3 4 3 4 4 4
South Africa 2 1 2 2 2 2
South Korea
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 17 2 1 1  8 4 1 1 7 8 4 2 1 7
Sweden 4 2 3 4  
 
4 4 3 4  4 4 4 4
Switzerland
 
15 1 2 2 2 4 8 4 2 7 5 8 4 4 7
Taiwan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turke  
UK 11 3 5 4 1 4 3 7 4 4 65 5 7 6 4 6 6
US 69 11 10 7 4 9 6 14 14 7 7 915 15 17 12 7 17 68
All    334 36 60 62 13 63 6 72 114 73 62 2295  106 137 124 73 136 81
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Table 2: Holding Period Returns (%) on Portfolios of Banks and Market Indices 
The table shows raw returns of value-weighted portfolios of exposed and unexposed banks, and corresponding market in-
dices, by crisis, exposure concept and period. Also reported are p-values (in brackets) of Wilcoxon tests of differences in re-
turns between bank returns and market returns as well as between exposed and unexposed banks. The event dates (t=0) are 
defined as 19Dec1994 (Mexico 1994), 2Jul1997 (Asia 1997), 17Aug1998 (Russia 1998), 2Sep1998 (LTCM 1998), 6Jan1999 
(Brazil 1999) and 11Sep2001 (Sept. 11, 2001). Panel A is based on U.S. dollar returns; Panel B shows local currency returns. 
Panel A: U.S. Dollar Returns 
   Exposed Banks Unexposed Banks  
Crisis Exposure Period Banks Market Banks vs Market Banks Market Banks vs Market Exp. vs Unexp. 
Mexico 1994 country -110 to -11 -9.3 -8.2 [0.46] -6.1 -5.7 [0.50] [0.36] 
  -10 to 50 -3.0 -6.3 [0.46] -0.6 -2.2 [0.41] [0.22] 
  51 to 120 14.7 11.0 [0.41] 13.9 10.4 [0.36] [0.37] 
 region -110 to -11 -8.0 -7.5 [0.49] -6.1 -5.7 [0.49] [0.42] 
  -10 to 50 -2.9 -5.5 [0.48] -0.6 -2.2 [0.40] [0.25] 
  51 to 120 14.4 10.8 [0.42] 13.9 10.4 [0.36] [0.35] 
 broad -110 to -11 -7.1 -7.0 [0.49] -7.0 -6.0 [0.48] [0.48] 
  -10 to 50 -3.0 -5.4 [0.48] 0.0 -1.7 [0.50] [0.27] 
  51 to 120 14.5 10.8 [0.44] 13.1 10.1 [0.37] [0.39] 
Asia 1997 country -110 to -11 22.3 15.5 [0.19] 14.0 15.1 [0.41] [0.24] 
  -10 to 50 2.5 -2.3 [0.49] 3.6 1.2 [0.33] [0.24] 
  51 to 120 -7.3 -5.2 [0.44] 6.0 1.0 [0.37] [0.27] 
  121 to 210 6.4 10.0 [0.37] 16.0 16.1 [0.43] [0.28] 
 region -110 to -11 21.7 15.7 [0.20] 14.0 15.3 [0.42] [0.27] 
  -10 to 50 0.9 -1.8 [0.44] 3.6 1.3 [0.32] [0.25] 
  51 to 120 -4.7 -3.7 [0.41] 5.9 0.8 [0.38] [0.30] 
  121 to 210 10.0 12.0 [0.45] 15.3 15.7 [0.45] [0.41] 
 broad -110 to -11 21.8 15.5 [0.19] 13.5 15.9 [0.45] [0.23] 
  -10 to 50 1.0 -1.7 [0.45] 3.6 0.8 [0.30] [0.25] 
  51 to 120 -5.4 -3.9 [0.43] 6.4 0.8 [0.37] [0.30] 
  121 to 210 10.3 12.1 [0.46] 14.4 15.3 [0.50] [0.44] 
Russia 1998 country -110 to -11 15.1 7.9 [0.27] -1.3 2.9 [0.40] [0.09] 
  -10 to 50 -29.9 -9.8 [0.19] -9.0 -6.9 [0.43] [0.22] 
  51 to 120 13.0 13.3 [0.39] 10.4 15.5 [0.28] [0.50] 
 region -110 to -11 13.2 7.1 [0.31] -1.5 3.2 [0.41] [0.13] 
  -10 to 50 -28.5 -9.7 [0.22] -9.3 -7.1 [0.45] [0.22] 
  51 to 120 13.6 13.6 [0.43] 11.4 15.2 [0.31] [0.48] 
 broad -110 to -11 8.1 5.1 [0.44] -0.9 4.2 [0.37] [0.24] 
  -10 to 50 -24.9 -9.1 [0.25] -7.3 -6.2 [0.42] [0.25] 
  51 to 120 13.5 13.5 [0.44] 9.7 15.7 [0.27] [0.40] 
LTCM 1998 country -110 to -11 4.3 1.7 [0.26] -6.2 -2.2 [0.40] [0.18] 
  -10 to 50 -28.8 -1.8 [0.15] -3.8 0.4 [0.49] [0.20] 
  51 to 120 16.2 6.1 [0.38] 5.8 7.7 [0.42] [0.40] 
 region -110 to -11 3.3 1.0 [0.39] -10.1 -3.6 [0.35] [0.19] 
  -10 to 50 -20.2 -2.4 [0.22] 2.4 1.6 [0.50] [0.20] 
  51 to 120 10.9 6.7 [0.43] 7.1 8.5 [0.37] [0.46] 
 broad -110 to -11 1.8 0.3 [0.43] -9.8 -3.3 [0.37] [0.22] 
  -10 to 50 -18.3 -1.9 [0.26] 2.0 1.3 [0.50] [0.23] 
  51 to 120 10.6 6.8 [0.44] 7.3 8.5 [0.37] [0.45] 
Brazil 1999 country  -110 to -11 -9.7 4.2 [0.33] 9.4 8.0 [0.41] [0.32] 
  -10 to 50 11.4 5.5 [0.34] 6.0 8.5 [0.33] [0.36] 
  51 to 120 -2.2 1.7 [0.36] -0.9 3.8 [0.35] [0.42] 
 region -110 to -11 -8.7 4.0 [0.37] 9.2 7.7 [0.45] [0.35] 
  -10 to 50 10.8 5.2 [0.34] 7.6 8.4 [0.39] [0.37] 
  51 to 120 -1.8 1.5 [0.40] 0.2 3.8 [0.41] [0.38] 
 broad -110 to -11 -7.2 4.1 [0.38] 10.1 8.6 [0.41] [0.38] 
  -10 to 50 10.9 6.0 [0.35] 4.7 7.7 [0.31] [0.24] 
  51 to 120 -1.8 2.2 [0.36] -0.8 2.9 [0.44] [0.39] 
Sept. 11 country -110 to -11 7.2 4.6 [0.49] 4.1 -0.9 [0.28] [0.39] 
  -10 to 50 2.9 -1.6 [0.35] -7.8 -5.0 [0.41] [0.25] 
  51 to 120 -7.7 0.4 [0.44] 0.7 -0.3 [0.43] [0.49] 
 region -110 to -11 4.2 1.2 [0.48] 4.6 -0.8 [0.25] [0.37] 
  -10 to 50 -0.3 -3.2 [0.32] -8.7 -5.1 [0.32] [0.21] 
  51 to 120 -4.2 0.6 [0.42] 1.1 -0.5 [0.40] [0.42] 
 broad -110 to -11 6.5 2.9 [0.41] 2.4 -3.4 [0.29] [0.45] 
  -10 to 50 -2.1 -2.4 [0.44] -11.0 -6.8 [0.36] [0.25] 
  51 to 120 1.3 0.5 [0.39] -1.9 -0.9 [0.47] [0.25] 
(continued) 
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Table 2: Holding Period Returns (%) on Portfolios of Banks and Market Indices (continued) 
Panel B: Local Currency Returns 
 
      Exposed Banks  Unexposed Banks   
Crisis Exposure Period Banks Market Banks vs Market Banks Market Banks vs Market Exp. vs Unexp.
Mexico 1994 country -110 to -11 -7.4 -6.2 [0.49] -4.7 -4.3 [0.47] [0.47] 
  -10 to 50 -6.0 -9.3 [0.42] -3.4 -5.0 [0.40] [0.16] 
  51 to 120 4.9 1.1 [0.41] 6.9 3.3 [0.25] [0.37] 
 region -110 to -11 -6.2 -5.7 [0.48] -4.7 -4.3 [0.47] [0.48] 
  -10 to 50 -5.9 -8.5 [0.46] -3.5 -5.1 [0.41] [0.20] 
  51 to 120 5.3 1.7 [0.45] 6.9 3.3 [0.25] [0.32] 
 broad -110 to -11 -5.4 -5.3 [0.47] -5.5 -4.5 [0.47] [0.50] 
  -10 to 50 -5.8 -8.2 [0.47] -3.3 -4.9 [0.41] [0.23] 
  51 to 120 5.8 2.1 [0.44] 5.8 2.8 [0.26] [0.40] 
Asia 1997 country -110 to -11 20.5 13.8 [0.11] 14.0 15.0 [0.41] [0.24]
  -10 to 50 5.6 0.7 [0.48] 5.7 3.3 [0.36] [0.32] 
  51 to 120 -4.9 -2.8 [0.47] 7.1 2.0 [0.35] [0.30] 
  121 to 210 7.2 10.8 [0.33] 17.2 17.2 [0.44] [0.22] 
 region -110 to -11 20.7 14.7 [0.12] 13.9 15.1 [0.40] [0.20] 
  -10 to 50 4.0 1.3 [0.39] 5.6 3.3 [0.34] [0.28] 
  51 to 120 -2.8 -1.8 [0.45] 7.1 1.9 [0.34] [0.31] 
  121 to 210 10.9 13.0 [0.41] 16.4 16.9 [0.43] [0.32] 
 broad -110 to -11 21.0 14.7 [0.13] 12.8 15.2 [0.43] [0.19] 
  -10 to 50 4.2 1.4 [0.40] 5.4 2.6 [0.31] [0.28] 
  51 to 120 -3.2 -1.8 [0.46] 7.3 1.7 [0.36] [0.32] 
  121 to 210 11.5 13.2 [0.41] 15.0 15.9 [0.47] [0.37] 
Russia 1998 country -110 to -11 15.6 8.4 [0.24] 1.0 5.2 [0.38] [0.10]
  -10 to 50 -35.7 -15.6 [0.21] -13.3 -11.2 [0.41] [0.19] 
  51 to 120 16.0 16.2 [0.39] 11.8 16.9 [0.28] [0.44] 
 region -110 to -11 14.2 8.1 [0.30] 0.5 5.3 [0.36] [0.13] 
  -10 to 50 -34.0 -15.3 [0.23] -13.8 -11.6 [0.43] [0.19] 
  51 to 120 16.3 16.2 [0.41] 13.0 16.8 [0.30] [0.43] 
 broad -110 to -11 10.3 7.3 [0.39] 0.1 5.3 [0.36] [0.22] 
  -10 to 50 -31.1 -15.3 [0.26] -11.4 -10.2 [0.40] [0.21] 
  51 to 120 15.9 15.8 [0.41] 10.9 16.8 [0.27] [0.38] 
LTCM 1998 country -110 to -11 4.0 1.4 [0.27] -4.8 -0.9 [0.39] [0.21]
  -10 to 50 -34.1 -7.1 [0.18] -8.4 -4.2 [0.46] [0.22] 
  51 to 120 17.9 7.8 [0.37] 7.0 8.8 [0.42] [0.37] 
 region -110 to -11 3.2 0.9 [0.39] -8.3 -1.9 [0.34] [0.21] 
  -10 to 50 -25.2 -7.4 [0.24] -1.8 -2.6 [0.50] [0.18] 
  51 to 120 12.7 8.5 [0.43] 8.2 9.6 [0.37] [0.39] 
 broad -110 to -11 2.3 0.8 [0.43] -8.3 -1.8 [0.32] [0.22] 
  -10 to 50 -23.2 -6.8 [0.27] -2.0 -2.7 [0.49] [0.21] 
  51 to 120 12.3 8.4 [0.46] 8.5 9.7 [0.35] [0.41] 
Brazil 1999 country -110 to -11 -14.4 -0.4 [0.31] 5.8 4.4 [0.44] [0.30]
  -10 to 50 14.1 8.1 [0.39] 7.5 10.0 [0.33] [0.34] 
  51 to 120 0.6 4.6 [0.38] 0.8 5.5 [0.37] [0.45] 
 region -110 to -11 -14.1 -1.4 [0.34] 5.3 3.8 [0.47] [0.30] 
  -10 to 50 13.6 8.0 [0.43] 9.2 10.1 [0.37] [0.38] 
  51 to 120 1.2 4.6 [0.40] 2.0 5.6 [0.42] [0.40] 
 broad -110 to -11 -12.4 -1.1 [0.36] 6.4 4.9 [0.39] [0.33] 
  -10 to 50 13.7 8.7 [0.43] 6.0 9.0 [0.27] [0.22] 
  51 to 120 1.1 5.1 [0.37] 0.9 4.5 [0.43] [0.42] 
Sept. 11 country -110 to -11 7.2 4.6 [0.49] 3.4 -1.9 [0.33] [0.44]
  -10 to 50 2.9 -1.6 [0.35] -6.1 -3.0 [0.40] [0.27] 
  51 to 120 -7.7 0.4 [0.44] 1.5 0.8 [0.45] [0.47] 
 region -110 to -11 4.2 1.3 [0.44] 3.7 -2.0 [0.30] [0.42] 
  -10 to 50 0.7 -2.0 [0.32] -7.0 -3.1 [0.40] [0.23] 
  51 to 120 -4.3 0.5 [0.45] 2.1 0.9 [0.40] [0.39] 
 broad -110 to -11 6.5 2.9 [0.43] 1.1 -5.2 [0.29] [0.49] 
  -10 to 50 -1.5 -1.8 [0.45] -8.6 -3.9 [0.35] [0.35] 
    51 to 120 1.3 0.4 [0.38]  -0.5 1.1 [0.49] [0.31] 
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Table 3: Tests of Returns of Unexposed Banks 
The table shows the raw returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of unexposed banks for different crises, time intervals 
and exposure definitions. In particular, returns are calculated for alternatively 20 days after the event date (i.e. [0, 20]) or the entire 
period after the event (i.e. [0, 210] for the Asian crisis and [0, 50] for all other crises). For each crisis, exposure definition and time 
interval, the table reports the number of banks (N), the raw returns or cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as well as the corre-
sponding p-values (in brackets) of tests for returns being equal to zero. The event dates (t=0) are defined as 19Dec1994 (Mexico 
1994), 2Jul1997 (Asia 1997), 17Aug1998 (Russia 1998), 2Sep1998 (LTCM 1998), 6Jan1999 (Brazil 1999) and 11Sep2001 (Sept. 11, 
2001). CAR1 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between raw returns and returns on the local market index. 
CAR2 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between raw returns and returns on the Datastream world market 
index. CAR3 is based on abnormal returns defined as the difference between returns in excess of the Euro currency interest rate 
and predicted excess returns from a regression during days –110 to –11 of returns on the local market index, the Canadian Dollar, 
the German Mark, the French Franc, the British Pound, the Italian Lira, the Japanese Yen and the one-day return on a 7-day 
Euro-dollar deposit on the bank return. Bank and market index returns are in excess of the Euro-currency interest rate. Currency 
returns are calculated as the difference between the one-day Euro-currency rate of the foreign currency (compounded by the ex-
change rate) and the one-day Euro-currency rate of the U.S. dollar. CAR4 is similar to CAR3, but uses the world market index in-
stead of the local market index. Panel A is based on U.S. dollar returns; Panel B shows local currency returns. 
Panel A: U.S. Dollar Returns 
Crisis Exposure  Interval N Raw Return CAR1 CAR2 CAR3  CAR4 
Mexico 1994 country [0,20] 217 2.52 [0.00] -0.04 [0.92] 1.22 [0.00] 1.06 [0.02]  1.34 [0.01]
  [0,50] 217 2.21 [0.00] 2.43 [0.00] 3.61 [0.00] 2.19 [0.01]  2.52 [0.01]
 region [0,20] 216 2.54 [0.00] -0.03 [0.94] 1.24 [0.00] 1.08 [0.01]  1.35 [0.00]
  [0,50] 216 2.20 [0.00] 2.43 [0.00] 3.60 [0.00] 2.21 [0.01]  2.51 [0.01]
 broad [0,20] 190 3.06 [0.00] -0.14 [0.68] 1.75 [0.00] 1.14 [0.01]  2.19 [0.00]
  [0,50] 190 2.69 [0.00] 2.78 [0.00] 4.09 [0.00] 2.83 [0.00]  4.12 [0.00]
Asia 1997 country [0,20] 202 1.45 [0.05] -0.13 [0.85] -2.07 [0.00] 0.77 [0.27]  -0.10 [0.90]
  [0,210] 204 17.88 [0.00] 7.12 [0.00] 4.18 [0.12] 11.03 [0.00]  6.86 [0.02]
 region [0,20] 198 1.37 [0.06] -0.22 [0.75] -2.15 [0.00] 0.74 [0.30]  -0.19 [0.80]
  [0,210] 200 17.46 [0.00] 7.04 [0.00] 3.76 [0.16] 11.50 [0.00]  6.50 [0.03]
 broad [0,20] 180 0.94 [0.10] -0.81 [0.05] -2.58 [0.00] 0.57 [0.18]  -0.27 [0.57]
  [0,210] 182 15.63 [0.00] 7.45 [0.00] 1.94 [0.49] 15.64 [0.00]  7.92 [0.01]
Russia 1998 country [0,20] 232 -3.99 [0.00] 0.68 [0.30] -0.16 [0.85] -0.62 [0.49]  -2.25 [0.02]
  [0,50] 232 -0.16 [0.92] -0.71 [0.63] -0.25 [0.88] -1.55 [0.28]  -4.34 [0.01]
 region [0,20] 227 -3.94 [0.00] 0.74 [0.27] -0.11 [0.90] -0.58 [0.52]  -2.18 [0.03]
  [0,50] 227 -0.21 [0.90] -0.80 [0.60] -0.30 [0.86] -1.70 [0.25]  -4.40 [0.01]
 broad [0,20] 191 -1.52 [0.05] 1.79 [0.00] 2.31 [0.00] 0.19 [0.80]  0.01 [0.99]
  [0,50] 191 2.64 [0.01] 0.92 [0.28] 2.55 [0.02] -0.22 [0.85]  -1.40 [0.25]
LTCM 1998 country [0,20] 312 -2.43 [0.00] -0.62 [0.40] -2.94 [0.00] -0.41 [0.55]  -2.52 [0.00]
  [0,50] 312 8.36 [0.00] -0.89 [0.47] -2.42 [0.07] 1.65 [0.19]  -2.01 [0.17]
 region [0,20] 231 -0.62 [0.50] 0.76 [0.38] -1.13 [0.22] 0.65 [0.42]  -0.37 [0.70]
  [0,50] 231 8.87 [0.00] -1.29 [0.42] -1.98 [0.23] 1.24 [0.41]  -1.05 [0.55]
 broad [0,20] 227 -0.57 [0.54] 0.78 [0.38] -1.08 [0.25] 0.63 [0.44]  -0.31 [0.75]
  [0,50] 227 8.74 [0.00] -1.45 [0.37] -2.11 [0.21] 1.04 [0.50]  -1.16 [0.52]
Brazil 1999 country [0,20] 208 -1.25 [0.03] -1.57 [0.01] -1.63 [0.01] -1.08 [0.08]  0.83 [0.22]
  [0,50] 208 2.38 [0.02] -2.52 [0.01] -0.37 [0.71] 0.04 [0.96]  6.15 [0.00]
 region [0,20] 206 -1.12 [0.05] -1.42 [0.02] -1.50 [0.01] -0.95 [0.12]  0.97 [0.15]
  [0,50] 206 2.54 [0.01] -2.36 [0.01] -0.21 [0.83] 0.17 [0.87]  6.37 [0.00]
 broad [0,20] 179 -1.89 [0.00] -2.19 [0.00] -2.26 [0.00] -1.41 [0.02]  0.18 [0.77]
  [0,50] 179 -0.75 [0.35] -4.64 [0.00] -3.50 [0.00] -1.09 [0.26]  3.34 [0.00]
Sept. 11 country [0,20] 300 -5.81 [0.00] -4.25 [0.00] -4.78 [0.00] -5.46 [0.00]  -6.10 [0.00]
  [0,50] 300 -2.02 [0.01] -5.42 [0.00] -6.82 [0.00] -5.36 [0.00]  -3.22 [0.00]
 region [0,20] 286 -5.82 [0.00] -4.22 [0.00] -4.79 [0.00] -5.39 [0.00]  -6.09 [0.00]
  [0,50] 286 -2.20 [0.01] -5.50 [0.00] -7.00 [0.00] -5.48 [0.00]  -3.28 [0.00]
 broad [0,20] 231 -5.52 [0.00] -3.57 [0.00] -4.49 [0.00] -4.30 [0.00]  -5.20 [0.00]
  [0,50] 231 -3.41 [0.00] -6.08 [0.00] -8.22 [0.00] -5.23 [0.00]  -2.01 [0.05]
(continued) 
Table 3: Tests of Returns of Unexposed Banks (continued) 
Panel B: Local Currency Returns 
Crisis Exposure Interval N Raw Return  CAR1  CAR2  CAR3   CAR4 
Mexico 1994 country [0,20] 217 1.33 [0.00] -0.04 [0.92] 1.32 [0.00] 1.07 [0.01]  2.10 [0.00]
  [0,50] 217 -0.05 [0.95] 2.44 [0.00] 3.91 [0.00] 2.56 [0.00]  3.73 [0.00]
 region [0,20] 216 1.34 [0.00] -0.03 [0.94] 1.34 [0.00] 1.10 [0.01]  2.12 [0.00]
  [0,50] 216 -0.07 [0.92] 2.43 [0.00] 3.91 [0.00] 2.60 [0.00]  3.75 [0.00]
 broad [0,20] 190 1.64 [0.00] -0.14 [0.68] 1.86 [0.00] 1.25 [0.00]  2.31 [0.00]
  [0,50] 190 0.06 [0.93] 2.79 [0.00] 4.44 [0.00] 2.86 [0.00]  4.15 [0.00]
Asia 1997 country [0,20] 202 4.30 [0.00] -0.13 [0.85] -2.12 [0.00] 1.12 [0.11]  1.01 [0.16]
  [0,210] 204 24.99 [0.00] 7.12 [0.00] 4.64 [0.09] 8.76 [0.00]  5.88 [0.05]
 region [0,20] 198 4.18 [0.00] -0.22 [0.75] -2.20 [0.00] 1.10 [0.12]  0.93 [0.20]
  [0,210] 200 24.61 [0.00] 7.04 [0.00] 4.22 [0.12] 9.16 [0.00]  5.51 [0.07]
 broad [0,20] 180 3.64 [0.00] -0.81 [0.05] -2.60 [0.00] 0.97 [0.02]  0.83 [0.07]
  [0,210] 182 21.49 [0.00] 7.45 [0.00] 2.09 [0.46] 13.11 [0.00]  6.55 [0.02]
Russia 1998 country [0,20] 232 -8.54 [0.00] 0.68 [0.30] -0.11 [0.90] -1.18 [0.19]  -4.46 [0.00]
  [0,50] 232 -9.67 [0.00] -0.73 [0.63] -0.23 [0.89] -2.23 [0.12]  -7.11 [0.00]
 region [0,20] 227 -8.51 [0.00] 0.74 [0.27] -0.05 [0.95] -1.17 [0.20]  -4.41 [0.00]
  [0,50] 227 -9.76 [0.00] -0.81 [0.60] -0.29 [0.86] -2.42 [0.10]  -7.19 [0.00]
 broad [0,20] 191 -6.54 [0.00] 1.79 [0.00] 2.32 [0.00] -0.60 [0.42]  -2.28 [0.00]
  [0,50] 191 -7.63 [0.00] 0.91 [0.29] 2.56 [0.02] -1.47 [0.20]  -4.25 [0.00]
LTCM 1998 country [0,20] 312 -4.22 [0.00] -0.62 [0.40] -2.91 [0.00] -0.57 [0.39]  -2.89 [0.00]
  [0,50] 312 3.40 [0.01] -0.90 [0.47] -2.47 [0.06] 1.81 [0.16]  -1.47 [0.32]
 region [0,20] 231 -2.15 [0.02] 0.76 [0.38] -1.10 [0.23] 0.44 [0.58]  -0.79 [0.39]
  [0,50] 231 3.85 [0.03] -1.30 [0.41] -2.04 [0.22] 1.40 [0.35]  -0.54 [0.76]
 broad [0,20] 227 -2.10 [0.03] 0.78 [0.38] -1.06 [0.26] 0.40 [0.62]  -0.73 [0.44]
  [0,50] 227 3.74 [0.03] -1.46 [0.37] -2.17 [0.20] 1.19 [0.43]  -0.64 [0.72]
Brazil 1999 country [0,20] 208 0.29 [0.62] -1.57 [0.01] -1.62 [0.01] -1.00 [0.10]  0.56 [0.40]
  [0,50] 208 6.99 [0.00] -2.51 [0.01] -0.37 [0.72] 0.92 [0.33]  6.36 [0.00]
 region [0,20] 206 0.44 [0.45] -1.41 [0.02] -1.49 [0.01] -0.86 [0.16]  0.69 [0.29]
  [0,50] 206 7.19 [0.00] -2.36 [0.01] -0.21 [0.84] 1.05 [0.27]  6.58 [0.00]
 broad [0,20] 179 -0.59 [0.28] -2.19 [0.00] -2.26 [0.00] -1.24 [0.05]  0.00 [1.00]
  [0,50] 179 3.49 [0.00] -4.63 [0.00] -3.50 [0.00] 0.12 [0.90]  3.75 [0.00]
Sept. 11 country [0,20] 300 -5.85 [0.00] -4.27 [0.00] -4.80 [0.00] -5.68 [0.00]  -5.87 [0.00]
  [0,50] 300 -0.19 [0.80] -5.40 [0.00] -6.80 [0.00] -5.19 [0.00]  -3.10 [0.00]
 region [0,20] 286 -5.85 [0.00] -4.24 [0.00] -4.81 [0.00] -5.63 [0.00]  -5.84 [0.00]
    [0,50] 286 -0.39 [0.62]  -5.48 [0.00]  -6.98 [0.00]  -5.28 [0.00]   -3.12 [0.00]
 broad [0,20] 231 -5.56 [0.00] -3.60 [0.00] -4.52 [0.00] -4.59 [0.00]  -4.90 [0.00]
  [0,50] 231 -1.18 [0.20] -6.05 [0.00] -8.19 [0.00] -4.99 [0.00]  -1.81 [0.06]
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Table 4: Structural Model Asset Volatility Estimates 
This table shows asset volatility estimates from the structural model for each of the crisis events, averaged across broad 
exposure classifications and regional locations. Standard errors are asymptotic standard errors for the portfolio ob-
tained from the maximum likelihood estimates (outer product of the gradient). The assumed maturity is 1 year, the de-
fault barrier is assumed to be demand deposits plus short-term debt, and the average of USD, Euro (German), and 
Japanese short-term government rates at the crisis date is used as the riskfree rate. Asset volatilities for each bank are 
computed using maximum likelihood from data the year prior (PreCrisis) or the year after (PostCrisis) the crisis date, 
with a linearly interpolated default barrier. 
 
 All Banks Asian Banks European Banks Americas Banks 
  Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed
Mexico                 
n 77 160 13 55 43 57 21 48
PreCrisis 10.230% 10.215% 10.113% 13.355% 8.724% 6.983% 13.384% 10.454%
std.error 0.049% 0.037% 0.135% 0.076% 0.061% 0.045% 0.102% 0.071%
PostCrisis 8.565% 10.338% 11.805% 15.337% 8.344% 5.125% 7.010% 10.801%
std.error 0.047% 0.036% 0.140% 0.081% 0.059% 0.040% 0.087% 0.070%
∆(PrePost) -1.665% 0.124% 1.692% 1.983% -0.380% -1.859% -6.374% 0.347%
std.error 0.008% 0.004% 0.054% 0.015% 0.013% 0.008% 0.029% 0.014%
Asia                 
n 89 117 14 47 57 40 18 30
PreCrisis 9.293% 10.988% 12.599% 14.289% 7.003% 6.183% 13.974% 12.224%
std.error 0.044% 0.045% 0.146% 0.084% 0.046% 0.055% 0.121% 0.097%
PostCrisis 15.038% 15.007% 17.919% 17.292% 13.887% 9.903% 16.444% 18.232%
std.error 0.057% 0.053% 0.171% 0.092% 0.066% 0.071% 0.133% 0.118%
∆(PrePost) 5.745% 4.019% 5.320% 3.003% 6.884% 3.721% 2.470% 6.007%
std.error 0.008% 0.006% 0.060% 0.018% 0.011% 0.014% 0.042% 0.028%
Russia/LTCM                 
n 83 173 16 64 55 53 12 56
PreCrisis 15.257% 14.916% 15.814% 15.359% 14.400% 10.816% 18.445% 18.292%
std.error 0.057% 0.042% 0.147% 0.071% 0.066% 0.062% 0.168% 0.083%
PostCrisis 13.286% 15.783% 14.509% 15.571% 13.146% 12.196% 12.294% 19.421%
std.error 0.059% 0.046% 0.151% 0.077% 0.070% 0.069% 0.158% 0.091%
∆(PrePost) -1.972% 0.867% -1.304% 0.212% -1.254% 1.381% -6.150% 1.129%
std.error 0.009% 0.005% 0.053% 0.013% 0.013% 0.013% 0.067% 0.016%
Brazil                 
n 93 166 16 64 59 51 18 51
PreCrisis 17.562% 16.342% 15.375% 15.098% 17.731% 12.774% 18.949% 21.471%
std.error 0.061% 0.046% 0.149% 0.073% 0.074% 0.070% 0.151% 0.097%
PostCrisis 13.256% 15.694% 16.449% 16.859% 12.935% 12.599% 11.471% 17.328%
std.error 0.054% 0.044% 0.154% 0.077% 0.065% 0.065% 0.121% 0.087%
∆(PrePost) -4.305% -0.648% 1.074% 1.760% -4.796% -0.176% -7.478% -4.143%
std.error 0.008% 0.005% 0.054% 0.013% 0.013% 0.013% 0.046% 0.018%
Sept. 11                 
n 70 199 0 87 12 102 58 10
PreCrisis 12.349% 12.092% n/a 13.905% 6.130% 10.684% 13.636% 10.695%
std.error 0.063% 0.035% n/a 0.059% 0.104% 0.044% 0.074% 0.156%
PostCrisis 10.931% 10.682% n/a 13.443% 5.453% 8.434% 12.064% 9.594%
std.error 0.059% 0.033% n/a 0.057% 0.097% 0.040% 0.069% 0.144%
∆(PrePost) -1.418% -1.410% n/a -0.461% -0.677% -2.250% -1.572% -1.101%
std.error 0.010% 0.003% n/a 0.009% 0.041% 0.006% 0.013% 0.067%
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Table 5: Structural Model Default Probabilities Estimates 
This table shows default probability estimates from the structural model for each of the crisis events, averaged across 
broad exposure classifications and regional locations. Standard errors are asymptotic standard errors for the portfolio 
obtained from the maximum likelihood estimates (outer product of the gradient). The assumed default horizon is 1 
year, the default barrier is assumed to be demand deposits plus short-term debt, and the average of USD, Euro (Ger-
man), and Japanese short-term government rates at the crisis date is used as the riskfree rate. Default probabilities for 
each bank are computed using maximum likelihood from data the year prior (PreCrisis) or the year after (PostCrisis) 
the crisis date, with a linearly interpolated default barrier, and the implied asset value 3 days before and after the crisis 
date, respectively. 
 
 All Banks Asian Banks European Banks Americas Banks 
  Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed
Mexico                 
n 77 160 13 55 43 57 21 48
PreCrisis 2.143% 2.907% 0.001% 4.004% 1.558% 4.091% 4.668% 0.190%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
PostCrisis 3.862% 3.393% 0.011% 5.989% 5.180% 3.471% 3.548% 0.324%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
∆(PrePost) 1.719% 0.485% 0.010% 1.986% 3.622% -0.620% -1.120% 0.134%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Asia                 
n 89 117 14 47 57 40 18 30
PreCrisis 2.553% 2.120% 0.007% 4.089% 1.993% 1.390% 6.307% 0.008%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
PostCrisis 5.805% 2.775% 2.292% 4.182% 6.606% 2.608% 6.002% 0.793%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
∆(PrePost) 3.252% 0.655% 2.285% 0.092% 4.612% 1.217% -0.305% 0.785%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Rus-
sia/LTCM                 
n 83 173 16 64 55 53 12 56
PreCrisis 5.264% 2.393% 6.619% 4.278% 4.370% 1.334% 7.555% 1.275%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
PostCrisis 5.229% 2.819% 5.822% 3.921% 5.567% 2.548% 2.917% 1.835%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
∆(PrePost) -0.035% 0.425% -0.797% -0.358% 1.197% 1.214% -4.638% 0.560%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Brazil                 
n 93 166 16 64 59 51 18 51
PreCrisis 3.905% 2.735% 4.299% 3.632% 3.588% 3.394% 4.596% 0.968%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
PostCrisis 3.182% 2.639% 7.205% 2.976% 2.994% 4.335% 0.222% 0.527%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
∆(PrePost) -0.723% -0.096% 2.906% -0.656% -0.594% 0.941% -4.374% -0.441%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Sept. 11                 
n 70 199 0 87 12 102 58 10
PreCrisis 0.200% 3.410% n/a 2.458% 0.534% 3.958% 0.131% 5.912%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% n/a 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
PostCrisis 0.087% 2.047% n/a 1.705% 0.400% 1.965% 0.023% 5.726%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% n/a 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
∆(PrePost) -0.113% -1.362% n/a -0.753% -0.134% -1.993% -0.108% -0.187%
std.error 0.000% 0.000% n/a 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
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Table 6: Structural Model Distance to Default Estimates 
This table shows estimates of the distance to default metric using the asset volatilities and implied asset values from the 
structural model for each crisis event, averaged across broad exposure classifications and regional locations. For esti-
mating the asset volatilities, the assumed maturity is 1 year, the default barrier is assumed to be demand deposits plus 
short-term debt, and the average of USD, Euro (German), and Japanese short-term government rates at the crisis date 
is used as the riskfree rate. Distances to default are computed using the pre- and post-crisis asset volatility estimates, 
and the implied asset value and linearly interpolated default barrier  3 days before and after the crisis date, respectively. 
 
 All Banks Asian Banks European Banks Americas Banks 
  Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed
Mexico                 
n 77 160 13 55 43 57 21 48
PreCrisis 3.157 4.151 3.733 4.434 2.769 4.208 3.598 3.791
PostCrisis 3.113 4.054 3.590 4.415 2.749 3.977 3.548 3.750
∆Post-Pre -0.044 -0.097 -0.143 -0.019 -0.020 -0.231 -0.050 -0.041
Asia             
n 89 117 14 47 57 40 18 30
PreCrisis 3.535 4.479 3.508 4.231 3.510 4.944 3.639 4.260
PostCrisis 3.518 4.416 3.454 4.215 3.508 4.832 3.604 4.204
∆Post-Pre -0.016 -0.063 -0.054 -0.017 -0.002 -0.112 -0.034 -0.056
Russia/LTCM          
n 83 173 16 64 55 53 12 56
PreCrisis 2.165 3.144 2.028 3.930 2.208 2.942 2.160 2.475
PostCrisis 2.087 3.137 1.946 3.902 2.124 2.899 2.117 2.497
∆Post-Pre -0.078 -0.007 -0.082 -0.027 -0.084 -0.043 -0.043 0.022
Brazil             
n 93 166 16 64 59 51 18 51
PreCrisis 2.101 3.211 2.224 4.395 2.028 2.568 2.226 2.401
PostCrisis 2.057 3.204 2.130 4.361 1.958 2.530 2.328 2.425
∆Post-Pre -0.044 -0.008 -0.094 -0.034 -0.070 -0.038 0.102 0.024
Sept. 11             
n 70 199 0 87 12 102 58 10
PreCrisis 2.937 3.949 n/a 4.874 2.744 3.225 2.977 2.876
PostCrisis 2.826 3.935 n/a 4.840 2.323 3.203 2.930 2.888
∆Post-Pre -0.111 -0.014 n/a -0.034 -0.421 -0.023 -0.047 0.012
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Table 7: Implied Bankruptcy Probabilities from Option Prices of Unexposed Banks  
This table reports statistics derived from implied default probabilities (Deltas) from option prices of unexposed banks 
around financial crisis. Delta estimates are obtained from non-linear least squares estimation of the Câmara (2004) delta-
geometric option pricing model. Panel A reports time-series averages of daily cross-sectional averages for different peri-
ods before and after each crisis date. T=50 for all but the Asian crisis when T=200. The reported p-values are inverse 
ranks of the average post-crisis values compared with the 100 trading days preceding each crisis date. Panel B reports es-
timated coefficients and p-values from time-series panel regressions with bank fixed effects. The variable Crisis Dummy 
is equal to 0 for the pre-crisis period (t<0) and 1 for the post-crisis period (t≥0). A value significantly greater than zero 
implies an increase in estimated default probabilities in the post-crisis period. Panel C repeats the regressions in Panel B 
but includes lagged estimated default probabilities and the model sum of squared errors as control variables. For the 
Asian crisis the estimation includes 200 trading days before and after each crisis date. For the other crises the estimation 
includes 50 trading days before and after the crisis date. All estimates use the “broad” exposure definitions except Sep-
tember 11th which uses the “region” definition. 
  
Panel A: Average Estimated Deltas 
 Asia Russia/LTCM Brazil Sept. 11
Pre-Crisis (t=-100,..., -1) 1.34% 1.11%  3.08% 2.53%
Post-Crisis (t=0,...,20)  1.10%  2.68%  2.48%  4.28%
∆Post-Pre  -0.24%  1.58%  -0.60%  1.75%
    p-value  0.76 <0.01  0.77 <0.01
Post-Crisis (t=0,...,T)  1.48%  3.38%  2.43%  4.22%
∆Post-Pre   0.15%   2.27%   -0.65%   1.69%
    p-value  0.34 <0.01  0.77 <0.01
   
Panel B: Time-Series Panel Regression with Bank Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Delta(t) Asia Russia/LTCM Brazil Sept. 11
Crisis Dummy coef. 0.17% 2.17%  -1.01% 1.81%
 p-value <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001
R-Square 0.237 0.364  0.415 0.434
Number of Unexposed Banks 46 52  50 57
Time-Series Observations 401 101  101 101
   
Panel C: Time-Series Panel Regression with Bank Fixed Effects and Controls 
Dependent Variable: Delta(t) Asia Russia/LTCM Brazil Sept. 11
Crisis Dummy coef. 0.04% 0.88%  -0.23% 0.76%
 p-value 0.010 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001
   
Control Variables:   
Delta (t-1) coef. 0.713 0.627  0.652 0.566
 p-value <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001
SSE coef. 0.0004 -0.0005  0.0044 0.0014
 p-value <0.001 0.117  <0.001 <0.001
R-Square 0.628 0.622  0.674 0.619
Number of Unexposed Banks 46 52  50 57
Time-Series Observations 401 101  101 101
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Appendix A: Crisis Dates and Descriptions 
 
Mexican Crisis - December 19, 1994 
On December 19, 1994, the Zedillo administration, in order to supposedly better manage the nation's 
foreign reserves, instructed the Banco de Mexico (Mexico's central bank) to widen the band for trading 
pesos with the U.S. dollar from 3.47 to 4.00--a rise of 15.3 percent. Contrary to expectations, this sup-
posedly modest 15 percent devaluation triggered a massive speculative run against the peso as markets 
concluded that the announced peg could not be maintained. Despite the Central Bank's efforts to defend 
the peso, foreign financiers and domestic investors, fearing a repetition of the 1982 debt crisis, fled the 
country. In the ensuing stampede, Mexico lost over $5 billion in international reserves in less than two 
days. On December 22, the authorities allowed the peso to float freely against the dollar, provoking an 
immediate additional 15 percent depreciation of the peso. As the financial hemorrhage (now christened 
the Mexican peso crisis) deepened, it became evident that a contagion, the so-called tequila effect, was 
beginning to take its toll on neighboring countries and threatening to engulf the entire region. (Source: 
The Missed Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis,  by Shalendra Sharma, Challenge,  Jan, 2001) 
 
Asian Crisis - July 2, 1997 
On July 2, 1997, The Bank of Thailand announces a managed float of the baht and calls on the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund for "technical assistance."  The announcement effectively devalues the baht by 
about 15-20 percent. It ends at a record low of 28.80 to the dollar. This is a trigger for the East Asian 
crisis. In the coming months, additional East Asian currencies come under attack and devalue one by 
one. (Source: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ globalmacro/AsiaChrnology1.html) 
 
Russian Crisis - August 17, 1998 and LTCM Crisis - September 2, 1998 
On August 17, 1998, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of Russia an-
nounced the gradual devaluation of the Ruble, the imposition of a repayment moratorium on certain 
loans to foreigners and the compulsory restructuring of approximately $40 billion of outstanding short 
term treasury securities. The announcements unsettled financial markets in Russia to a significant degree 
and led to a rapid decline in the value of the Ruble, a collapse in the value of traded equity stock in Rus-
sian companies and the virtual cessation of international fixed income securities offerings by both Rus-
sian sovereign and corporate issuers. This led President Yeltsin to remove the reform-minded Govern-
ment led by Prime Minister Kiriyenko, which precipitated a further decline in confidence in the Russian 
financial system and further downward pressure on the value of the Ruble. Subsequent actions by the 
Central Bank and the acting representatives of the Russian Government did little to generate confidence 
among the investment community that Russia's financial problems could be addressed rapidly. The wid-
ening of interest rate differentials between developed and developing market debt caused difficulties for 
a major US hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). With largely borrowed funds LTCM 
had speculated extensively in a general narrowing of yield differentials. As markets started to assess the 
size of LTCM’s holdings, rumors of an eminent collapse at a major global bank started to swirl. These 
rumors are widely believed to have started on September 2nd. Eventually, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York coordinated a bailout of the fund (announced September 23). This along with three cuts in 
the Federal Funds target rate (on September 29, October 15, and November 17) by the Federal Open 
Market Committee served to lessen worries of an impending global financial meltdown. (Sources include: 
Russian Financial Crisis, by Wayne P. J. McArdle, Thomson FindLaw)  
 
 
Brazilian Crisis- January 6, 1999 
On January 6, 1999, Itamar Franco, the governor of the influential province of Minas Gerais, announced 
a moratorium on his state’s payments to the central government. Following on the heels of a critical de-
feat on fiscal deficit reduction, the payment suspension triggered a crisis of confidence in the ability of 
the Cardoso regime and led to a rapid acceleration in the capital outflows that had already halved the na-
tion’s reserves from a level of $70 billion in early 1998. The president of the central bank tendered his 
surprise resignation, and a week later, in reaction to capital outflows and a diving stock market, Brazil's 
government devalued the nation's currency, allowing it to fall more than 8%. This devaluation rekindled 
fears about the country's stability and set off turbulence in financial markets around the globe, primarily 
due to renewed fears that Brazil's financial difficulties could destabilize other Latin American nations, 
undermine the rescue efforts of the International Monetary Fund and lead to lower currency values in 
developing countries. On January 15, the Brazilian government, battered by an outflow of dollars from 
its foreign reserves, devalued further by lifting exchange-rate controls and allowing the currency to trade 
freely at market value. The announcement that the central bank would permit market forces to determine 
the value of its currency came 24 hours after the bank had ruled out such a move -- fearing it would send 
currency downward in value. However, investors were relieved that Brazil had apparently abandoned its 
policy of spending dollar reserves to defend its currency against unrestrained selling by speculators who 
were betting it would fall in value. Brazilian stocks rise by 33% on the news. (Source: Brazil Devalues Its 
Currency Sending Shock Waves Around The World, Dollars & Sense, January 1999, Vol. 4, No.1) 
 
Terrorist Attacks on U.S.- September 11, 2001 
Aside from the appalling loss of life and sizable loss of property, one of the most visible effects of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was the disruption to the workings of the financial system. The 
destruction of the World Trade Center towers in New York inflicted severe damage on banking and fi-
nancial institutions in Lower Manhattan; markets closed, participants relocated to backup sites, commu-
nications links failed or were unreliable, settlement instructions were lost, payments were delayed, and 
the Federal Reserve at one point injected more than $100 billion in additional liquidity, an unprecedented 
sum. At the core of it all was the disruption of interbank payments. Several banks had difficulty process-
ing payment instructions, and the resulting accumulation of large balances drove net balances in the re-
mainder of the banking system negative, necessitating the Fed’s huge injections. Problems continued to 
plague financial markets, in particular the security lending and repurchase market where settlement fail-
ures were widespread. Failures to settle various transactions left offsetting payment and security delivery 
obligations sitting on the balance sheets of market participants, along with the underlying cash or securi-
ties that were awaiting delivery, reducing bank capital ratios. In addition, many firms drew on bank lines 
of credit in response to operational difficulties rolling over commercial paper. On Friday September 14, 
federal banking regulators issued a Joint Interagency Statement noting that many banks may experience 
temporary balance sheet growth, and urging banks to contact their regulators should they anticipate a 
resulting decline in their regulatory capital ratio. The Federal Reserve later issued a Supervisory Letter 
allowing banks some flexibility in calculating capital ratios for the third quarter of 2001. Bank regulators 
also encouraged banks to lend to customers (“take prudent steps to make credit available to sound bor-
rowers”) affected by the events of September 11. (Source: Payment System Disruptions and the Federal 
Reserve Following September 11, 2001, by Jeffrey M. Lacker, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond working pa-
per). 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
Table B-1: Summary Statistics of Time Series 
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of returns on value-weighted 
portfolios of banks with and without broad exposure and the corresponding market indices. Excess re-
turns are calculated as logarithmic daily dollar returns in excess of the one-day return on the 7-day Euro-
dollar deposit. 
 
Crisis Exposure Variables Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Mexico 1994 no Bank portfolio return 0.026 0.701 -2.480 2.410
  Market portfolio return 0.010 0.671 -2.501 2.087
  Bank portfolio excess return 0.011 0.701 -2.497 2.393
  Market portfolio excess return -0.005 0.671 -2.516 2.071
 yes Bank portfolio return 0.019 1.129 -3.962 7.078
  Market portfolio return -0.007 0.779 -3.130 2.617
  Bank portfolio excess return 0.004 1.129 -3.978 7.062
  Market portfolio excess return -0.022 0.779 -3.146 2.600
Asia 1997 no Bank portfolio return 0.118 0.811 -4.149 2.718
  Market portfolio return 0.102 0.760 -4.609 3.033
  Bank portfolio excess return 0.103 0.811 -4.164 2.702
  Market portfolio excess return 0.087 0.760 -4.625 3.018
 yes Bank portfolio return 0.087 1.311 -4.334 6.526
  Market portfolio return 0.068 0.802 -3.255 3.645
  Bank portfolio excess return 0.071 1.311 -4.349 6.510
  Market portfolio excess return 0.053 0.802 -3.270 3.629
Russia 1998 no Bank portfolio return 0.006 1.364 -4.569 4.373
  Market portfolio return 0.060 1.059 -3.734 3.218
  Bank portfolio excess return -0.008 1.364 -4.584 4.358
  Market portfolio excess return 0.045 1.059 -3.749 3.203
 yes Bank portfolio return -0.014 1.705 -5.818 5.004
  Market portfolio return 0.041 1.080 -3.693 2.942
  Bank portfolio excess return -0.029 1.705 -5.832 4.989
  Market portfolio excess return 0.026 1.080 -3.709 2.927
LTCM 1998 no Bank portfolio return -0.002 1.354 -4.672 3.946
  Market portfolio return 0.028 1.056 -3.785 2.825
  Bank portfolio excess return -0.017 1.354 -4.687 3.931
  Market portfolio excess return 0.013 1.056 -3.800 2.810
 yes Bank portfolio return -0.025 1.786 -5.837 4.869
  Market portfolio return 0.022 1.125 -3.785 3.055
  Bank portfolio excess return -0.040 1.786 -5.852 4.854
  Market portfolio excess return 0.007 1.125 -3.801 3.040
Brazil 1999 no Bank portfolio return 0.061 1.352 -4.110 4.897
  Market portfolio return 0.083 1.047 -3.959 3.264
  Bank portfolio excess return 0.047 1.352 -4.126 4.883
  Market portfolio excess return 0.069 1.047 -3.974 3.249
 yes Bank portfolio return 0.008 1.614 -5.415 4.325
  Market portfolio return 0.053 1.012 -3.709 2.588
  Bank portfolio excess return -0.006 1.615 -5.430 4.310
  Market portfolio excess return 0.039 1.012 -3.724 2.573
Sept. 11 no Bank portfolio return -0.045 1.016 -5.425 3.943
  Market portfolio return -0.048 0.982 -5.293 3.129
  Bank portfolio excess return -0.053 1.017 -5.475 3.936
  Market portfolio excess return -0.057 0.983 -5.352 3.124
 yes Bank portfolio return 0.025 1.198 -4.692 5.124
  Market portfolio return 0.004 1.096 -4.830 3.956
  Bank portfolio excess return 0.017 1.199 -4.745 5.116
    Market portfolio excess return -0.004 1.097 -4.889 3.948
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Table B-2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Exposures 
The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between country 
exposures (Panel A), region exposures (Panel B) and broad exposures 
(Panel C) across different crises. A, b, and c refer to the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Correlations of Country Exposures 
 
Mexico 
1994 
Asia 
1997 
Russia 
1998 
LTCM 
1998 
Brazil 
1999 
Asia 1997 42.5a  
Russia 1998 42.7a 60.2a  
LTCM 1998 38.1a 34.7a 41.7a  
Brazil 1999 57.0a 63.0a 81.0a 37.4a  
Sept 11 26.9a 19.0a 16.2a 43.9a 15.6a 
 
 
Panel B: Correlations of Region Exposures 
 
Mexico 
1994 
Asia 
1997 
Russia 
1998 
LTCM 
1998 
Brazil 
1999 
Asia 1997 52.5a  
Russia 1998 48.5a 65.3a  
LTCM 1998 43.9a 60.1a 96.1a  
Brazil 1999 63.1a 63.7a 73.6a 70.4a  
Sept 11 20.1a 20.9a 20.0a 23.4a 16.8a 
 
 
Panel C: Correlations of Broad Exposures 
 
Mexico 
1994 
Asia 
1997 
Russia 
1998 
LTCM 
1998 
Brazil 
1999 
Asia 1997 69.4a  
Russia 1998 61.4a 74.3a  
LTCM 1998 42.3a 58.8a 74.1a  
Brazil 1999 64.8a 74.4a 89.9a 65.1a  
Sept 11 -8.9  -11.2b  -16.3a -8.3  -14.6a 
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Appendix C: Structural Model Estimation Methodology 
Recall that under the Merton (1974) model, the firm’s asset value Vt evolves according to the diffusion: 
tt t V tdV V dt V dWµ σ= +  (1) 
with expected return, µ , and volatility, Vσ , both unobserved. The equity value of the firm at time t is de-
noted by St, and the firm’s (zero-coupon) debt has face value F, maturing at T, and with value Dt( Vσ ) at time 
t, where the functional dependence of the risky debt value is made explicit. The following accounting identity 
holds at all times: 
( )t t t VV S D σ= + . (2) 
Note that this directly implies that given a functional form under the model for the risky debt value 
Dt, St is an invertible function of Vt for any Vσ . Under the Merton model, the debt value is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r T t tt V t t Vr T tVD Fe d d T tFeο σ− − − −⎛ ⎞= Φ − + Φ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−  (3) 
( ) ( ) ( )21ln ln
2t V
t
V
V F r T
d
T t
σ
σ
⎛ ⎞− + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= −
t
 (4) 
And therefore the key functional relationship for the equity value is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); , r T tt t V t t t VS g V t V d Fe d T tσ σ− −= = Φ − Φ − − , (5) 
which can be solved for any fixed t and asset volatility, Vσ , for the implied firm value, v*. Finally, we note that 
the probability of default under the actual measure, is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )21ln ln
2t V
t
V
F V T
P
T t
µ σ
σ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟= Φ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
t
. (6) 
 
59
In order to derive the likelihood function, suppose that we observed the asset values, v, of a firm with 
a constant face value of debt over a sample period of size N with a time step of h.24 That is, the hypothetical 
observed asset value sample up to t is denoted { }0 2 3, , , , ,h h h Nhv v v v v…  with t Nh= . Since the conditional 
distribution of the observed asset values is log-normal, the log-likelihood function is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2
0 2 2
1 1
1
, , , , ; , ln 2 ln ln
2 2 2
1ln
2
N N
kh
h h Nh V V kh
k kV
kh
kh V
k h
wN NL v v v v h v
h
vw h
v
µ σ π σ σ
µ σ
= =
−
= − − − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑…
 (7) 
However, we observe only the equity values { }0 2 3, , , , ,h h h Nhs s s s s…  with . These values are re-
lated directly to the unobserved asset values by equation (5). Thus we can express the likelihood function of 
the sample equity values as the product of the asset value likelihood and the Jacobian of the transformation 
t Nh=
( ); ,t tS g V t Vσ= . The log-likelihood is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
0 2 2
1 1 1
1
2
*, , , , ; , ln 2 ln ln * ln *
2 2 2
*
* ; ,
ln * ln
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h h Nh V V kh kh
k k kV
kh V
kh V
kh
V
wN NL s s s s h v d
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v F r T kh
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T kh
µ σ π σ σ
σ
σ
σ
= = =
−
= − − − − − Φ
1
* 1ln
* 2
1
kh
k h
kh kh V
v h
v
µ σ
−
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= − −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
=
− + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= −
∑ ∑ ∑…
(8) 
Given parameters for F, r, and T (obtained from balance sheet data and interest rate markets) and eq-
uity values, we maximize Equation 8 to obtain estimates of the unobserved asset drift and volatility. These 
estimates both pre- and post-crisis are then used to compute the change in default probabilities. 
                                                
⎛ ⎞
 
24 Typically, the value of h for daily data would be 1/250. 
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